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the ALTERNATIVE

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by William Kristol
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on Pornography

Sobering Thoughts by R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr.

New Thoughts by Leslie Lenkowsky

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The Continuing Crisis

JANUARY, THE END of the first year of Mr. Nixon's second administration, and it seems that the President's traditional honeymoon with the press and the loyal opposition is about over. Early in the month Operation Candor was canceled when the Senate Watergate Committee became gluttonous and asked for more than six hundred White House tapes and documents. But by the end of the month misery was in the air.

● For one thing the Internal Revenue Service, fresh from a triumph over the celebrated miser, Mr. Jack Benny, had reopened its investigation of Mr. Nixon's tax return and promised to look into Mrs. Tricia Nixon Cox's returns as well. Then a panel of high-fidelity experts reported that not even the buzz of H.R. Haldeman's pet housefly could have caused that eighteen and one-half minute embarrassment in the tape of his conversation with the President on June 20, 1972. It was the result of deliberate erasures, disclosures which proved too much even for an old sport like Judge Sirica, who turned his collected evidence over to the grand jury and recommended that it consider possible criminal charges. Worse still, special prosecutor Leon Jaworski, after ordering the FBI into the case, stated publicly that his office was engaged in plea bargaining with at least one quondam public official and that indictments would be forthcoming in a matter of weeks. *Newsweek*, after publishing a January 14 cover story on Mr. Ronald Ziegler that implicated Brooks Brothers, Disneyland, J. Walter Thompson, and the University of Southern California, followed it up with a cover story implying that it was only a matter of time before Mr. Nixon resigned or was indicted. And on January 21 one of the most awesome symphonies of shrieks and whoops ever heard in Washington resounded from Capitol Hill indicating that though not all the boys were back yet, the historic Ninety-third Congress had reconvened. Mr. Nixon's hour was at hand.

● The Minnesota Vikings woke up late on the afternoon of January 13 to discover that they had lost the Super Bowl to the Miami Dolphins. Mr. William Saxbe was sworn in as Mr. Nixon's fourth attorney general in one and one-half years. And top executives in the dog food industry became uneasy when Mr. Ralph Nader's dog passed away.

● Zaire continues its wave of reform. From Kinshasa, Zaire's Minister in Charge of Political Affairs and Coordination of Party Activities announced that the twenty-one gun salute will be replaced by the less expensive twenty-one drum salute. But while the spirit of reform energizes the civic life of Zaire, it threatens with extinction one of Swaziland's most colorful pageants, its incomparable fertility rite. For years Swazilanders have believed that the limbs of a freshly slaughtered human, when planted in a farmer's field, will increase his land's yield. Now philistines high in government are demanding an end to these local customs before they spread to California. And Uganda's famous president, General Idi Amin, has initiated a "Save Britain" fund. Having heard of the effects of the fuel shortage in Britain the Napoleon of Uganda kicked in $5000 and signed a magisterial decree urging his countrymen to help "save our former colonial masters from economic catastrophe."

● Apparently marijuana will remain illegal in America despite a UCLA scientist's findings that it may aid asthma, but at least the Agricultural Department is dropping its ban on the use of swine blood in sausages and puddings. The grim business of liberating America is being made a bit easier by courageous educators at the University of California at Davis, who are finally recognizing the personhood of dogs. Dogs will now be allowed to reside in dormitories provided the question has followed the course of democratic process. Further, the old myth about the supposed inferiority of canine intelligence was given the boot when dogs were admitted to classes with no apparent depression in the curve. What is even more promising is the fact that this great university has initiated a prototype Canine Studies Department by offering two credit hours for a class called "Companion Animals" in which students discuss their pets' experiences and their individual hang-ups in dealing with pets on a person to person basis. Guest lecturers discourse on the psychology of canine companionship and on the legal responsibilities of pet ownership—you've come a long way, Spot!

● On January 19 Egypt and Israel signed an agreement to disengage their delicately intermingled armies along the Suez Canal, and President Nixon gave a generally optimistic account of the energy situation in a nationally broadcast radio address. Three hours later UCLA lost its first game in eighty-nine starts. On that same day the theory that an American presence in Vietnam would induce Red China to attack was somewhat tarnished when Chinese troops swarmed across South Vietnamese outposts in the Paracel Islands. It was a sad moment for the South Vietnamese, but the diplomats of that nation did not do their cause any good when they distracted delegates at the United Nations from the far more crucial matter of dealing constructively with Representative Patricia Hutar's proposal to hold a worldwide conference on women's problems with special attention to women in India.

● Meanwhile the Soviet Union has planned a thousand-mile ski trek from the Taimyr Peninsula to the North Pole, apparently for the purpose of testing survival foods and ski wax. And there were some unusual robberies this month. On January 3 a gunman fleeing from a hold-up in Miami jumped into the wrong getaway car, which happened to be an unmarked patrol car. And in Richmond, California, a woman dressed in "a fashionable green pantsuit" walked into the local branch of Bank of America, seized $2,974 from the teller, and drove away in a new gold Cadillac with a chauffeur at the wheel. Who knows? She might even get caught now that the Burger Court has decided by a vote of six to three that the "exclusionary rule" does not apply to many cases of unsought evidence. Another debacle for civil liberties occurred in Manila, where a young man shouted fire in a crowded theater and found to his amazement that one girl was killed and fifty others injured in the ensuing stampede. The saddened idealist has not yet been identified.

● All in all, it was a lackluster January. The energy crisis kept the sophisticated natives of Albion groping for candles and torches and Prime Minister Heath's neck. And millions of early morning insomniacs combed the heavens in vain for a blazing streak, some expecting the Comet Kahoutek, others the Second Coming. What is worse, psychologist Dr. Susan Schiffman informs us that we simply cannot get along without light. After blending a wide variety of foods down to the same texture, Dr. Schiffman found that if we can't see the food, we have almost no idea what we are eating. She also tells us that as we grow older our sense of sweetness and saltness deteriorates long before our sense of bitterness and sourness—though this has been common knowledge for millenia. But none of this seems to bother Marty Snyder, a blind Republican committeeman in New York who helps review X-rated movies and votes on whether they are obscene. "Pornography isn't a case of seeing," he insists, "it's a case of feeling." Yes, on Mr. Snyder's advice mankind will survive this long, wintry gloom. Three people, however, will not: Dr. Alice Chase, author of *Nutrition for Health*, died in London of malnutrition, Tex Ritter, former singer and cowboy movie star, whose hits included "You Are My Sunshine," of a heart attack, and Glen Jackson of Melbourne, Australia, who was fatally stabbed on the beach by an uprooted umbrella which the wind carried for fifty yards in the air.

● As the Western world teeters over the abyss of decadence all eyes are on Chicago where Alderman Edward Burke introduced a resolution prohibiting topless manicurists with the philosophical observation that "I think people who would be silly enough to get an $11 shoeshine and manicure need the protection of the city." In Detroit eight indignant employees of a topless massage parlor complained to the State Employment Security Commission when their employer would not allow them to eat submarine sandwiches. And in Great Britain the government took a hard line against a gentleman from Roachdale who wanted tax-exempt status for his "temple of love" which turned out to be little more than a counseling service for floozies.

● But all of this effort at uplift may have come too late, for it seems that the communist world is giving up on the West. By the end of the month China had purged both Beethoven and Schubert. Russia had found Mr. Solzhenitsyn without literary merit. And *Pravda* expressed "serious concern" over the appalling growth of "tasteless imitations of Western folk songs," crammed with "false pathos or sweet sentimentality." In a plea for revolutionary moral sentiment *Pravda* called for lilting melodies for "use in civic demonstrations and in tight friendly circles around campfires." Who says there is no joy in communism! □

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Editorial

Intellectualoids: The Lumpen Intelligentsia

THE GREAT UNIVERSITIES of the land are now struggling through high seas merely because a handful of legislators have discovered that the dons have failed to educate those vast herds grazing on the nation's campuses and performing sexual acts in university libraries. Well what of it? The churches are not exactly turning out saints, and people die in hospitals all the time; nonetheless, I have not heard any churlish outbursts against these venerable institutions. No one is cutting back their budgets. As I see it the universities are having conferred upon them a bum rap, for if they are not exactly educating their clients, they are at least intellectualizing them and thereby providing the nation with a prodigious new source of entertainment, to wit: the modern American intellectualoid.

Now the educating of a student is a cold, grim business full of anguish and travail. But the intellectualizing of a disciple is a far sunnier task. It consists of seating the subject before a mirror, powdering him with bizarre prejudices, painting him with pretensions, convincing him of how uniquely improved he has become, and encouraging him to charge onto the stage and make a pest of himself. Intellectualizing a student is much like costuming a clown, and the universities have brought admirable efficiency to the process. Rather than hoots from hayshakers, they deserve encomiums and felicitations. Thanks to the postwar university's voracious appetite for young minds, we now find intellectualoids fussing and fretting in every niche and cranny of the great Republic, in every walk of life, and from every racial, religious, and ethnic provenance.

Some people have appraised intellectualoids a pain and even an embarrassment, but for me they have provided more spontaneous laughter than one hundred W.C. Fieldses, two hundred Laurels and Hardys, three hundred Woody Allenses, the United Nations, the League of Women Voters, the late George McGovern, and a man from Boone County, Indiana, who insists that chickens have extrasensory perception. Americans should be grateful for this priceless national resource, for they can enjoy the intellectualoids' antics without spending a dime. All they have to do is tune in the hour-long evening news report on National Public Radio or take up with the brethren at a nearby liberal salvation show—Unitarians have my personal recommendation, though the New Age Catholics are not to be sniffed at. And for those hard-core capitalists who insist on paying for their pleasures I suggest they subscribe to any of a host of earnest periodicals starting with *Newsweek* and devolving on to such old reliables as the *Nation*.

There are a multitude of other ways to encounter intellectualoids, for their numbers are increasing all the time. In fact so rapidly are they multiplying that many do not even bother to fit themselves out at the university. They merely purchase a Volkswagen and some Scandinavian stools, while migrating to artsy-craftsy purlieus and acquiring some "personal problems." Still without the expansion of what we Americans choose to call higher education, it is doubtful that the intellectualoid would ever have become such a prominent species in the American menagerie, and that is one of the reasons I consider the American university a useful public expenditure.

Of course intellectualoids are new to America, and perhaps that is why we have treated them so rudely. Since the end of the Second World War, ideas—usually someone else's ideas—have become the tools with which many Americans have earned their beefsteaks. These ideas have become advanced and have obviously had a dizzying effect on the practitioners of certain trades and professions. Consider the lowly school teacher. Once he taught the three R's and swatted brats. Today he elucidates math and sciences undreamed of by the schoolmarm of yore. School teachers must now keep up not only with the new areas of study but also with new methods of teaching, all of which smack of sociology, psychiatry, and disciplines once held hopelessly beyond their ken and still held in mysterious awe by the average gringo. Today's teacher has gotten a glimpse of what it is like to think seriously about ideas, and it has become too much for him. He has taken on airs. He apes the raiment of the Harvard faculty and murmurs ominously about what tomorrow may bring. Some read kinetic poetry and even play twelve-string guitars—some play lutes!

Not only are the denizens of the old professions engauding their afflati, but new professions have sprung up in the wake of advancing technology and progressive thought. Yesteryear's pipefitters and stevedores can today become computer jockeys, television commentators, masseurs and the like—men with only the meanest intelligence and culture, but men easily subject to delusions of a vast and asinine grandeur. I summon as exhibit A the incomparable Walter Cronkite and pass on.

Much of the equipment used by these snooty jacks has only recently rolled out of the laboratory, and by an idiotic leap in logic the oafs who operate this equipment often perceive themselves as *avant-courriers* on the frontiers of knowledge. These congenital mediocrities in earlier days would be minding soda fountains, but today they are manipulating advanced technology and it has proved too much for their equilibria. They now read yoga manuals. They think about group sex and even discuss its intellectual high points. They fancy themselves the heirs of Plato, Galileo, and Nicolo Sacco.

Now up until this point I have demurred from laying down any lapidified definition of the intellectualoid for fear of doing him an injustice. But I sense that you are becoming impatient. There is a stirring in the audience, and some have crumpled me into a ball and thrown me to the floor. So lest I importune on the rest of my audience, I shall tender a taxonomic sketch of this prodigy, and let the chips fall where they may. The intellectualoid comes in a variety of sizes and plumage, and there will never be a definition so comprehensive as to embrace all of his diversity, but you are restless and so *allons-y*.

Essentially in genus and in species the intellectualoid is that timeless creature of bathos and of misadventure, the dupe. He is Shakespeare's Malvolio, Shaw's Marchbanks, and McGovern's campaign worker. He is a dupe who has had a fleeting encounter with the halls of ivy or some other fount of advanced and exalted thought, and this experience has infected him with pretensions, both intellectual and moral. Now the extent of his encounter may vary, and so, just as with Masons and with murderers, there are intellectualoids of various degrees. A television technician, who is fetched by the dialectical prowess of Dick Cavett and who occasionally trots out a few audacities of his own, is a pretty low-grade specimen. But a college dropout, who shuffles paper for some giant corporation while terrorizing his mother with the visions of Norman O. Brown and with threats to join a commune, is an intellectualoid of a higher chop. Higher still are Eric Sevareid, Hunter S. Thompson, Ph.D., and Gloria Steinem. And from the very top chop come the likes of the Rev. Theodore Hesburgh, C.S.C., S.T.D., LL.D., Ralph Nader, LL.D., and Dr. John Galbraith, who writes books on economics or rather on a debasement of economics, his last book, *Economics and the Public Purpose*, being related to economics the way voodoo is related to brain surgery. Obviously the intellectualoid's diversity is so extensive as to be astonishing, so let us move on to his genealogy and to his preferences.

The intellectualoid is the direct descendant of the great American boob. He is the unfailing antagonist of his brother the clod. He is the spoiled brat of our time, an indolent, gullible ne'er-do-well with exiguous intellect and less character, lost forever in fantasies about his intellectual and moral superiority. The intellectualoid speaks condescendingly to practically everyone he encounters, though his knowledge of the world abounds with superstition and error. He prefers book reviews to books, newspapers to journals, and he chooses television documentaries and news stories over all of the above. He is a religious follower of National Public Radio, and he believes educational television sharpens the mind. His disposable income is almost totally exhausted on the intellectualized brummagem of the times. Today he buys recycled clothing and edible calendars. Yesterday he was living on seeds, nuts, and wheat germ.

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

Neil Howe

Defending Capitalism

IN THE EARLY FIFTIES the great economist Friedrick A. Hayek announced, with words then daring and prophetic, that "hot socialism . . .—that organized movement toward a deliberate organization of economic life by the state as chief owner of the means of production—is nearly dead in the Western world. The century of socialism in this sense probably came to an end around 1948." Events have since borne Hayek out. Today everyone observes that the specter of the completely managed economy, which once had entered such a titanic contest with capitalism for the affections of western man, indeed seems to have lost or at least has defaulted due to lack of interest. But events have also added a puzzling irony to this outcome, which I doubt even Hayek could have predicted.

Between the Great Depression and the Second World War socialists promised the capitalist world that they could satisfy our most thoroughly bourgeois desires—for increasing production, a high rate of investment, monetary expansion, an explosion in consumer goods, higher wages for the middle class—and do a better job of it than the bourgeoisie itself. Over the last two decades a variety of distinguished economists (Sumner H. Slichter was a famous instance in the United States) have demonstrated, by all or most of these criteria, how badly the socialist model has foundered. The United States versus the USSR, West versus East Germany, Japan versus China —these are showcases, but not exceptions to capitalism's superiority in servicing consumer-based, industrial societies. After the war, half of Western Europe seriously considered "going socialist." Today, now that the Western European economy has experienced its most affluent and expansionary generation in the free-market spirit of the EEC, such a course is unthinkable. The U.S. economy, though less stable, has thrived while yielding little to the practical side (and not at all to the theoretical side) of "hot socialism's" depression-years charm. Of course, most of the world is still (and may remain) content with peculiar hybrids of capitalist and socialist mechanisms. But at least for westerners mention of full-blown socialism suggests failure, more because of its obvious economic debacles (as in, say, Allende's Chile) than because of the questionable moral precepts of Maoist China.

The irony is that while capitalism has thus formally overcome its adversary, at no time in recent history have we westerners been so ambivalent toward capitalism as an economic way of life. When the issue of the contest was in doubt during the twenties, thirties, and forties, people took a zealous interest in the principles of competing economic systems. Today, Americans as well as Europeans are indifferent to the one set of principles which has persisted. Opposition to capitalism among intellectuals seems, if anything, to have increased since the war. Polls show that up to 60 percent of the American public has a "low" or "no" opinion of capitalism and business (often based on astonishing misinformation). The word "capitalism" itself is a recurrent opprobrium; among politicians, it is a shadowy concept that needs to be "ameliorated." As Irving Kristol observed in 1972 in what has quickly become a much-quoted apothegm, although socialism "has lost the argument," free enterprise "seems somehow not to have won it." Obviously, the problem is not that people do not know *what* capitalism is. Any schoolchild in a dozen western nations can recite the basic rules of a free market. The problem is rather that people do not know *why* capitalism, now on top, is to be preferred, or why its success and integrity should be protected.

Success mixed with indifference, even more than failure, poses awesome difficulties for the defender of capitalism nowadays. On the one hand, the decline of an idea through indifference wreaks consequences in the real world. "Economic planning" for war, poverty, inflation, depression, and illiteracy turns nominally free-market economies into subjects for political party platforms. Arbitrary state intervention, practiced with numbing regularity, steadily obscures the line between public and private, and so vitiates capitalism's greatest supposed benefit, guaranteed substantive due process. "Cool socialism," the managed economy which is not so much an idea as an expedient (the "Welfare State," for instance), is in the long run inevitable. On the other hand, we don't seem to know what to do about indifference. Over the last two decades, multifold proofs of capitalism's "economic" success—the proper antidote for charges of "economic" failure—have had little impact on publics which just don't care much whether the idea of capitalism succeeds *or* fails.

Whence our indifference? Why do so many of us remain unconvinced? Hypotheses abound. John Kenneth Galbraith sets the blame (or credit) on affluence, on a mounting superfluity of consumer goods and a rising real income which have dulled our interest in matters of economic principle. In human terms the decision to buy an extra TV set, he observes, is very different than the decision to buy an extra loaf of bread. When the public's marginal utility choices have reached a sufficiently high level, perhaps attention to economic questions about producing and allocating resources is displaced by attention to other issues—those, for instance, concerning social equality or civil liberties. Another theory, popular among "future shock" prophets, holds that complexity itself has led to an "expertization" of economic decision-making, and thus to a diminished attachment to capitalism as a common-sense way of life. It is said that old, easily apprehendible maxims about lending and borrowing, about the entrepreneur's incentives, about the vices of monopoly, or about metal-based currency, have been outstripped by a late or post-industrial world. But the problem with all such circumstantial explanations is that they are historically unreliable. In fact, both sheer "affluence" and sheer economic "complexity" are prerequisites to the birth of a capitalist economy; does it make sense that they should also account for a declining interest in capitalism's future? Consider the American twenties: an era of skyrocketing affluence and the unprecedented complexities of credit-buying, mass advertising, a growing Fed, and wild speculative markets; yet during the twenties Americans surely grew more, not less, attached to the free market's cosmopolitan allure.

I suggest that we have been misled, and

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that capitalism's popularity problem is due more to the way we now defend capitalism than to the changing worth of what is defended. In particular, I would point to two broad weaknesses of present-day arguments in defense of capitalism. One weakness is our overweening dependence upon the "economic" defense of capitalism's greater productivity and efficiency, the sensational and blatantly materialistic defense we see constantly in the western media. The other weakness (this I shall come to later) is our complementary insistence upon a "valueless" free market, which can be equated, in looser political language, to that hopeless quest for a "valueless" freedom.

I have already hinted that the most obvious failure of the "economic" defense is its inability to persuade. It *is* true that the defense itself has been largely vindicated since the war. It *is not* true that what is defended has or will remain worthwhile to the western imagination. Encomiums to a higher GNP or to a more efficient investment market may be heard and understood, but they cannot by nature invoke popular conviction in the system which sustains them. The problem with the "economic" defense, if it is to justify capitalism as an idea and not as a tool, is that it must assume that our lives are a logical, rather than an ethical, proposition. It must suppose (the nearly Marxian premise) that we are preprogrammed to achieve a certain material and quantitative measure of success. Over the last few decades the failure of affluence to satisfy (or even soothe) such "economic" yearnings is cause enough for skepticism. And the rise of New so-called "humanistic" Socialism—whose lofty goals are about as conducive to "economic" success as medieval usury laws—shows how easy it is for perfectly rational people to refuse (in Kristol's words) to "think economically."

Surely the most important reason why the "economic" defense is not always fit for popular consumption is that it is logically incomplete. As a rule, "economic" truisms belie unspoken premises which are more important than the defense itself. It is said that "capitalism is more efficient than socialism." But more efficient for what? Not for making war. At the very least, this argument presupposes a certain republican value judgment: that what is optimum efficiency in war (i.e., regimentation) is not optimum efficiency in peacetime. Nor, in peacetime, can we say that capitalism has led us to the most efficient method of transporting commuters to and from cities. Private autos are more "efficient" only if we could somehow put a price on illusions of freedom, status, machismo, or what have you. Efficiency is a rationally determined state of affairs, but capitalist efficiency is determined by the subjective, often frivolous, and ultimately noncoordinated preferences of individuals. It is also said that "capitalism is more productive." More productive to whom? Not to a public whose purchases have been planned for in advance. Capitalist productivity has few advantages if we start, say, with a Galbraithian "advertising and development" theory of consumption. If ITT's executives had to face the roller coaster demand of perfect competition, argues Galbraith (and here he is correct), we might expect more heart attacks among its staff—but certainly not increased productivity.

Furthermore, "economic" superiority is hard to define. W.W. Rostow among others has pointed out how performance comparisons between the U.S. and Soviet economies always depend upon the sort of performance each economist thinks most valuable. If, for instance, the adaptability of business to meet changes in consumer demand is heavily stressed, the capitalist model may come out on top; if long-run price, cost, and investment security is stressed (particularly in the heavy industries) the scale may tip to the socialist side. For all the discussion, there is no strictly "economic" way of settling such a comparison. Eduard Heimann has wisely concluded: "It is a myth typical of this age (the post-war era) that the answer to the technical problem of the productivity of capital must determine the political decision between capitalism and socialism . . . Once this myth is exploded we are free to recognize that the fundamental political decision between capitalism and socialism is a moral problem."

The briefest survey of history, in which ruthlessly rule-bound societies have sustained themselves "economically" for centuries, convinces me that Heimann is right. I am also convinced that in this crucial respect—in our ability to justify capitalism as the best solution to a "moral problem"—we have been declining steadily over the last hundred years. Nineteenth-century classical economists could point out, with ease and effectiveness, how the concept of the free market coincided with prevailing religious and ethical beliefs and a sense of "right living." This is exactly what we are powerless to make credible. To the classical mind, there was a complex symbiosis between, on the one hand, the Protestant ethic, post-Renaissance humanism, and liberal, enlightenment political theory, and on the other hand, the growth of the capitalist idea. Today, when an economist links economics with opinions about social behavior (e.g., linking the causes of inflation to prevailing theories of social reform), he does so at the risk of being annihilated by his fellows. Most classical economists thought themselves philosophers and openly developed their theories of "political economy" out of pre- or extra-capitalist value judgments, a set of givens that enjoyed broad popularity among educated peoples of the western world. Moral verities common to their era—e.g., that man is rational, that man is educable and can best educate himself through worldly trial-and-error, that the individual is the locus of ethical decision-making, that the best evolution of manners and morals is brought about by a free interplay of self-interests—these they thought were premises of a sound economy no less than of a sound way of life. Modern economists, who think themselves technicians, have a well-documented tendency to ignore the premises of their craft as well as solutions external to their system. It is characteristic of free-market advocates today (one must point to "Friedmanites" in America or the Institute of Economic Affairs in Britain) that state intervention is made to seem costly and inefficient. John Stuart Mill, by contrast, denied in a famous illustration that the state would be less efficient or inferior in building houses; but he argued against it anyway, because, he declared, wherever the state entered, individuals lost both freedom and maturity and became like children.

Why, in contrast to our own, was the classical defense characterized not by empirical "economic" proofs, but by a prudent, philosophic idealism? This is the less interesting question, and its simple answer is that the "economic" defense was then an impossibility. In the early 1800s it was not clear that nascent industrialism had raised the standard of living in Western Europe one whit; critics could argue seriously that the capitalist revolution had only made life worse for the average man. By the late 1800s Marx could predict, by "scientific" reasoning (and what a powerful word that was for frustrated adherents of Spenser and Fiske), that the top-heavy edifice would only worsen and fall before things got any better. Generally the nineteenth-century defender of capitalism shunned what he considered the piecemeal tyranny of scientific data, and instead argued the rhetoric of a rational and individualistic humanism. Thus, describing capitalism, Smith would point to the "divinely ordered harmony of egoistic and altruistic impulses in man," Malthus would stress the lessons of "Moral evil and Natural Law," and Mill would observe how effectively the free man's "moral barrier" had protected basic economic freedoms.

A modern would do better to ask why (again in contrast to our own) the western classical defense was so emminently successful that capitalism made good sense to nearly every social class, including (with a few qualifications) the *litterati* and *religiosi*, for well over a century. This question he can hardly begin to answer without conceding that the classical, antimaterialistic bias had one great advantage: it assured that capitalism would remain an ideal, and would not be weakened, as it is being weakened now, by indifference to capitalism as a mechanism. Classical economists knew very well—indeed they were surrounded by instances—that when a society collectively chooses to achieve limited and tangible ends (e.g., for food, land, war, equality, or indeed today, for cars and kilowatts), it would begin to supervise its economy accordingly. In such circumstances, people cannot help but feel diffident about a "free" market, whose justification, so the classical economists thought, is part of a wholly different relationship between the society and the individual. In a post-Keynesian era it is easy to smile at an age when moral pieties were occasionally abstracted into natural law. We forget that these rules of a classical economy were never designed to function in the alien cultures of the late twentieth century. We forget, for instance, that Smith never intended that his utilitarian *Wealth of Nations* (which today is sold in millions of copies) would be read independently of his *Theory of Moral Sentiments* (which today is out of print).

Over the last few decades, innumerable social scientists have observed that the legitimacy of capitalism has suffered from weakening institutional support. Few could deny this; it is almost self-evident that in a day when the maxims of Franklin were on parents' and teachers' and employers'

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minds, if not their lips, and when individual success along the "straight and narrow" won society's quiet applause, defending the idea of capitalism before one's fellows was likely to be easier than it is today. But this is only part of our problem. What no one (to my knowledge) had added is that our modern ideology of capitalism has worsened matters by espousing, in place of a normative defense, a resolute (and libertarian) conviction that capitalism lacks any norm whatsoever. This valued "valuelessness," as I mentioned earlier, is the second fundamental weakness in the way we look at capitalism nowadays. Ordinarily, when an essential western dogma has lost the support of the existing institutional hierarchy, it can look forward to better times when new or revitalized institutions will rescue it from oblivion. This has happened repeatedly with early western religions and with western political traditions. The dogma of capitalism, however, seems to be insuring itself against such a renewal (and in the process denying that it is a dogma): any emerging social, religious, or political institution, which must rally popular strength around certain well-defined value judgments, is repelled by a definition of capitalism that insists it is free of any. Indeed, in recent years certain demands of the *vox populi*—for decentralizing institutions, for individual "moral" responsibility, for local or racial autonomy, for guarantees against totalitarianism—are at least partially consistent with capitalism's traditions. The reason why these enthusiasms rarely incorporate "capitalism" into their rhetoric is not so much because capitalism is an argument of the opposition, but more because capitalism is thought to be outside the argument altogether.

Now this "valuelessness" is covered over with venerable and well-intended libertarian clichés. The market, we like to say, is "value free"; capitalism is superior because it is "morally neutral" toward economic decision-making; in a free-market, the referee is "unbiased"; out of thousands of metaphors, we might choose to liken capitalism to a clear glass, through which —but not by which—human preferences for one thing or another are expressed. And no doubt these ideas have freed our lives from centuries of arbitrary management. In an age when states dealt with merchants as summarily as with horse-thieves, the likes of Sir Dudley North are to be admired for first asserting this moral relativism. "Whenever men consult for the advancement of the publick good," he wrote in the late 1600s, "as for the advancement of trade wherein all are concerned, they usually esteem the immediate interest of their own to be the common measure of Good and Evil;" therefore it should be assumed that "there can be no trade unprofitable to the Publick; for if any prove so, men can leave it off; and wherever the traders thrive, the Publick, of which they are a part, thrives also." Each generation since North, these axioms, fundamental to the idea of capitalism, have been variously restated without much change in meaning.

But I suspect that these axioms can be and have been pushed so far in argument that people must begin to wonder: Exactly how do we value a value-free system of conducting our everyday business, in which "Good and Evil" are determined by whatever trade "prospers"? If capitalism is morally neutral, what is it, apart from the haphazard individual choices which might sustain it? How can we help but grow indifferent to an economic process which regards with perfect indifference our own state of affairs? Any essentially liberal system of thought, when carried to its extreme, becomes ever more useless as a statement of human ends or ultimate purposes. So it is with valuelessness *per se* as a defense of the free market—or, for that matter, of "freedom" in general. Joseph Schumpeter exaggerated terribly when he wrote that, in addition to alienating intellectuals, "capitalism is constitutionally unable to produce . . . *emotional* attachment to the social order." (He somehow concluded that such phenomena as entrepreneurialism, the Victorian political order, and the American frontier spirit were inconsistent with, even though part of, the history of capitalism.) But Schumpeter was correct in observing that the popularity of capitalism as an idea would be seriously threatened when capitalism's "rationalist," "antiheroic" attitudes would at last permeate and pervade established institutions. "The bourgeois fortress thus becomes politically defenseless," he wrote. Once society loses the western bourgeois ethic in which "capitalism" proper has thrived (characterized, according to Schumpeter, by the permanence of the family and the tangibility of property), the operational "valuelessness" and autonomy of the free market will be abandoned as altogether superfluous.

We live in an age of revolutionary cultural flux, and in such an age we grow indifferent to ideas which are not defined in sufficiently fundamental terms. Both our "economic" and "valueless" defenses of modern capitalism are ineffective because they lack foundations, a set of boundaries within which they are true and outside of which they are false. Understood simply and at face value, these two arguments are not even consistent. It is a peculiarity of our times that manipulating the state's fiscal affairs to speed up the economy is thought to be a morally "valueless" act, a way of making capitalism work "better," while a state-managed investment market (which might amount to the same thing) would be considered a crude violation of western freedoms. With amazing reluctance is it ever admitted that economic goals themselves imply debatable assumptions about which collective responsibilities our society should and should not assume. Because the arguments are inconsistent, few of us are serious about pursuing either one. Indeed, the only people who can honestly believe that capitalism is an essentially "economic" promise are opportunists, in the old Darwinian sense, to whom free enterprise is simply the best devised means for material aggrandizement. And the only people who can honestly believe that capitalism is "valueless" are radical libertarians, who deny that any norms need be enforced by a truly "free" market.

The rest of us, I think, would have to agree that there is something incomplete about opportunism, something nihilistic about drastic libertarianism, and something presumptuous about assuming that these alone will constitute an effective defense in the long run. A more inductive and broadly correlative approach is called for—an emphasis on what Wilhelm Roepke has called the "framework of a free market." "The market economy," he writes, "is a constantly renewed texture of more or less short-lived contractual relations. It can, therefore, have no permanence unless the confidence which any contract presupposes rests on a broad and solid ethical base on all market parties. . . . Even if we conscientiously credit the market with certain educational influences . . . the ultimate moral support of the market economy lies outside the market. Market and competition are far from generating their moral prerequisites autonomously. This is the error of liberal immanentism. These prerequisites must be furnished from outside, and it is, on the contrary, the market and competition which constantly strain them, draw upon them, and consume them."

What are these "moral prerequisites"? Here Roepke tends toward bombastic enthusiasm. "Self-discipline, a sense of justice, honesty, fairness, chivalry, moderation, public spirit, respect for human dignity" are all on his list. We would be less prejudiced if we were to observe and categorize the normative "prerequisites" historically necessary to capitalism's development. Among them might be: (1) A philosophic or religious conviction that the individual conscience supersedes communal morality. As Hayek defines it, it is "a respect for man *qua* man, that is, a recognition of his own views as supreme in his own sphere, however narrowly that may be circumscribed, and the belief that it is desirable that men should develop their own individual gifts and bents." (2) A tradition of a Rule of Law, which delimits the function of state authority. This tradition—the product of centuries of treaties, compromises, pacts, and codes—was what Gibbon used to distinguish western due process from the arbitrary rule of "oriental despotisms." Genuinely private contracts could not exist without it. (3) A social adherence to institutions that exercise authority over different domains, at different levels of legitimacy, and with different means of coercion. Robert Nisbet calls them "intermediary institutions" between the individual and the state. Thomas Molnar calls them the foundation of an "articulate society."

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Capitalism depends upon such diversity among the forces which mold individual preference. Such diversity justifies the free market. (4) Under the name of democratic political process, a trust in a Benthamite, individualist consensus rather than in a Rousseauian "general will." The one would characterize society as a collection of individual decision-makers, in which the state must uphold some common measure of civility and reason; the other suggests an organism, in which the state must form the organizing nucleus. The former (Aristotelian rather than Platonic model) has always preceded the growth of a capitalist voting public.

Doubtless there are many other prerequisites. But the purpose here is not so much to be comprehensive as to give shape and texture to what Roepke means when he talks about the "framework of a free market." The irony of our modern defense of capitalism is that the more thoroughly our "economic" and "valueless" arguments are vindicated in a narrow sense, the less effectively they will persuade or convince. What we have lost in our rational perspective on economics is the countervailing presence of prerational value judgments, a feeling for the cultural and historical and philosophic roots of the capitalist way of thinking. In recent decades, the best-known research into these aspects of capitalism have been conducted from diverse, but uniformly critical points of view (the names of Weber, Sombart, Hobson, Veblen, Commons, and Schumpeter come to mind). Considering how much indifference has greeted conventional rhetoric since the war, it may be time for those who wish to defend capitalism to look in the same direction and adopt the same method. □

"Come and Get It": The Politics of Affluence

BACK IN THE DAYS when student demonstrations were in vogue, one of the more popular themes for these little street convocations was "worker-student solidarity." When I was an undergraduate at Harvard, this concept was regularly trotted out as a recommended focus for concerned student attention, usually during those spells when the war in Vietnam seemed relatively quiet. Any strike or firing or other labor-management dispute was a sufficient catalyst; out would come the marchers, the speakers, the bullhorns, and the homemade signs, as if on cue, for a little display of concern and relevance in the collegiate Marxist tradition. Most of this, of course, very rapidly became trite to any nondemonstrator exposed to it for any length of time. There was, however, one aspect of these events which always struck me as fascinating — namely, the "economic theory" which seemed at the core of the entire ritual. This was best expressed in a particularly silly, but incredibly popular slogan which kept popping up at these demos, to wit, "30 Hours Work for 40 Hours Pay." Now, you might suppose this to be patently absurd to anyone with a week of high school economics under his belt, but not so. On the one occasion when I foolishly approached a young man carrying one of these signs and inquired about it, he responded impatiently with "Come on, man—you know the bosses can afford it. The current wage structure is a rip off." (Or words to that effect—I'll admit that I didn't write them down at the time.) But the idea was straightforward enough. All the wealth is just out there, see, and it's all a matter of dividing it up more equal like, you dig? The bosses can *afford* it.

This quaint little conception of macroeconomics has by no means died out the way student demonstrations have. The other day in one of my law school classes the professor mentioned in passing his "firm belief that individuals have a 'right not to work.'" (Don't ask me how these topics come up in a law class—I've given up trying to figure it out. I think, though, that this one had something to do with trying to mangle the Constitution to produce this new "right.") In any event, this idea was greeted with some considerable approval among those assembled. My own suggestion that the "right not to work" did not carry with it the right to be supported at someone else's expense was met in turn with mostly tolerant amusement. As one of my fellows put it to me after class, if we forced one to starve in order to exercise his right not to work, we would render that right "meaningless." This calamity could easily be avoided, he thought, since our highly industrialized society could well afford to support such a right. Understand? We can *afford* it.

One could easily dismiss all this as just one more expression of the self-righteous naïvité of a few leftist students, but to do so, I think, would be a mistake. For the idea it expresses—namely, that there's all kinds of wealth just sitting around, a certain portion of which belongs to every individual as part of his birthright—is actually a fairly pervasive one. Although he would resent the label, an academic entrepreneur named John Kenneth Galbraith earned X thousands of dollars a few years ago, as well as the accolades of *Time*, *Newsweek*, the *Washington Post*, and all the Arthur Schlesingers of the world, by writing a book called *The Affluent Society*. In essence, this less-than-weighty tome attempted to systematize the aforementioned view of the economy. It was, in the words of his paperback publisher, "A challenging argument for new economic structures based on an economy of wealth." A less charitable summary might be, "John Kenneth Galbraith tells an eager America how it should split up all its goodies." But the idea is the same in either case. The goodies are "there," somehow; the "economy of wealth" exists, *mirabile dictu*, as if by itself, an autonomous product of industrialization, created without the aid or effort of human hands. The book sold tons of copies, and became required reading in more economics classes than one cares to remember.

Mr. Galbraith, moreover, has others in the faith who have almost certainly never read his prose. General Motors recently laid off some auto workers, (Cadillacs aren't moving too well in this season of gasoline shortages), and the satraps of ABC decided this was worthy of a few "human interest" interviews to be broadcast into the nation's living rooms. Now, the UAW won a contract with GM some years back which has the company paying any worker with more than a year's seniority a sizable percentage of his salary for a considerable number of weeks in the event of a layoff. At the time, it seemed quite a concession; but no longer, as witness the following interview with a laid-off worker with *less* than a year's seniority:

Q: So the company won't be paying you anything?
A: No.
Q: No benefits?
A: None.
(Pause)
Q: Do you think that's fair?
A: No, I don't think it's fair at all—I don't get a thing.

And so, with the aid of our helpful leading questioner, GM's cruelty in not paying the salary of *everyone* whose services are no longer required is exposed for all to see.

Finally, consider the following information, gleaned from "The Economics of the New Unemployment," an article by Martin Feldstein in the fall, 1973 issue of the *Public Interest*. As Feldstein points out, the standard Keynesian formula for decreasing unemployment is to increase aggregate demand; usually, this means more deficit spending by the government, which creates more demand for goods and services, and thus generates new jobs for the unemployed. Simple, yes? But it seems it doesn't quite work. Milton Friedman would tell you (to oversimplify) that it doesn't work because the government simply competes with the private sector for available loan money, so there's no more money being spent, *in toto*, than there was before—only

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the spenders have changed. But Feldstein offers yet another reason: the problem isn't that jobs aren't there; rather, the problem is that people won't take them. In short, the idea of the "hard-core unemployed," unable to find jobs, is only about half true; the other half is that some people won't take or keep jobs that they find "unattractive." For example, Feldstein points out that most unemployment is of relatively short duration—over 50 percent being unemployed for less than five weeks. Similarly, much unemployment is voluntary—about 50 percent representing people who have voluntarily left their jobs. Moreover, this is true even when substantial public effort is made to find jobs for the unemployed. A Boston manpower program in the late 1960s had well over half of its participants turn down openings that the program agency had located for them.

Now, there are several reasons for this. For one thing, through welfare and unemployment compensation, whatever their other merits or demerits, the government provides notorious disincentives to work. For another, the minimum wage laws, as Feldstein illustrates, help turn many entry-level jobs into dead ends. In his words, "A firm can generally provide the opportunity to acquire new marketable skills—by on-the-job training, detailed supervision, or even just by learning by experience—only to a worker whose *net product during the period of training* is at least equal to his wage. Unfortunately, the current minimum wage law prevents many people from accepting jobs with low pay and valuable experience." In short, minimum wage raises the pay scale for entry-level jobs, but makes it too expensive for firms to turn those jobs into a route to something better.

All this is well and good, and Mr. Feldstein suggests a number of policies to alleviate the problem which merit serious consideration. But the most significant point of his article seems to me to be the one he makes at the very beginning; jobs are there, but people won't take them, even in a tight labor market. It would appear, then, that a significant portion of the population no longer thinks working is worth the candle. I suspect that this same portion of the population would be highly offended if this nation decided it would no longer subsidize that preference.

How does one counter all this? It is difficult, to say the least. When a Galbraith writes a book, a hundred Schlesingers and other worthies say things like "This brilliant book opens new paths in our understanding," or that anyone who fails to read it "will be opting out of serious discussion of the future of American life." The individual who dismisses the idea of a cornucopia of easily available wealth as so much bosh and attempts to put in a lonely word for the dignity and necessity of individual endeavor sounds, by contrast, as if he is singing the opening song of *All in the Family* along with Archie Bunker. ("Didn't have no welfare states/Everybody pulled his weight/Gee, our old La Salle ran great/Those were the days.") The politics of affluence is deeply ingrained, and one's acceptance of it has become a measure of his sophistication in any number of academic, journalistic, and political circles.

There is yet some hope, however, that what we lesser lights call "reality" will intrude. If there is benefit in an economy rapidly growing short of gasoline, paper, fuel oil, and electricity, it is surely the lesson that all these things are not the boundless gift of a munificent and indulgent providence. The economy is not, rumors to the contrary notwithstanding, the World's biggest *Reader's Digest* Sweepstakes, with 200,000,000 prizes guaranteed to be awarded. It seems there really is a bottom to the barrel. There really is an end.

It is strange, perhaps, that man's most advanced technological society needs to learn all over again the world's most fundamental lesson: Nothing is free. But it is not, after all, that painful a lesson. Its effect on our economic life would be most welcome; its effect on our spirit, even more so. □

Alan Reynolds

Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Pornography

FROM THE WAVE OF hysteria that followed the Supreme Court decision on pornography, one might suppose that Galileo and Darwin would not have made the grade under contemporary community standards. Art itself is seriously threatened, we're told, by the "average vigilantes." All in all, it's a pretty insulting, elitist view of the average man in the average community. Community control of schools is now terribly chic, it seems, but not so community control of porn parlors and skin flicks.

In part, this may be a reflection of sublime innocence. The issue is discussed, in editorials and TV talk shows, as though it were addressed to *Playboy* and the novels of D.H. Lawrence. In fact, the issue concerns magazines, photographs, films, and books explicitly depicting sado-masochism, child molesting, bestiality, lesbianism, oral and group sex, anal fetishism, and a variety of other practices and positions that defy description. This is over-the-counter stuff in most big cities, and a simple request for more "action" will bring even raunchier material from beneath the counter. Insulated by their affluent suburbs, the ritualistic liberals don't address themselves at all to the main issue of what proliferating smut shops and theaters can do to the aesthetics and safety of a shopping or entertainment area.

Nobody, in fact, really believes in unrestricted communications. A vigorous campaign of racist or anti-Semitic propaganda would be denounced for the same reason that wide-open pornography ought to be denounced—many innocent people would be injured or offended by such material and by the clientele it attracts. A handbook on how to practice bacterial warfare would be a likely candidate for censorship by even the most liberal of liberals. Unlike the subjects of most liberal-statist restrictions, these are matters that do affect third parties who are neither buyers nor sellers. In the polite language of social science, there are obvious "externalities," "social costs," or "neighborhood effects" arising from having an "adult" bookstore or theater next door to your apartment, store, or office.

Nor does anyone really believe that any business should be permitted to operate anywhere it wants: A refinery, auto body shop, or kennel would be most unwelcome in the residential sections of Scarsdale or Beverly Hills. Why on earth can't urban residents exercise similar control over the location of porn businesses, which are certainly no less offensive to the senses? Many people have to walk past skin flicks and "massage parlors" on the way to work, and their children may be indirectly or directly exposed to a rather demeaning, vicarious approach to sex ("Mommy: What's a 'Deep Throat'?").

Pornography shops are both a symptom and a contributing factor in the exodus of middle-class families from the cities. A multimillion dollar effort to fix-up downtown Sacramento, in an effort to bring back family shoppers, was partly thwarted by the infestation of the area by "adult" bookstores and movie theaters. New York's Times Square area has been ruined as a tourist attraction by scruffy little porn shops. The problem is very real to those who are close to it. It follows Gresham's law: bad business drives out good.

To control pornography, one must first be able to identify it. This is not so insurmountable a problem as many claim. Most communities have effectively limited minors' access to pornographic material. Few people have objected to this control, or have maintained that the classifications arrived at were entirely arbitrary. Indeed, many smut suppliers are only too happy to identify their products as intended for "adults only," as a selling point, thus advertising the prurient intent. There is a good possibility that reasonable restrictions on the location and sales-tax exemption of such material might well be workable using the industry's own classification scheme.

To say that pornography is hard to define is not to say that it doesnt exist, or that it doesn't present a problem. "Discrimination" is hard to define; so are "unfair competition," "intent to defraud," "unsanitary conditions," and "loitering." Conservatives are properly wary of granting judicial or regulatory bodies the authority to

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determine whether or not a crime has been committed after the fact. Nevertheless, some laws are both necessary and necessarily vague, and clear and predicable standards have usually evolved to deal with such cases.

Liberals, by contrast, are especially fond of such broad grants of authority, except when it comes to regulating smut. It is ludicrous for liberals to posture as opponents of state restrictions when they have created a society in which one must get the state's permission to work in many trades, to raise the price of one's labor or product, to set up a new business, or to advertise that your product cures acid indigestion. Aside from selling diluted hallucinogenic drugs, the only commerce *not* considered immoral by the New Left is the exploitation of the auto-erotic fantasies of the sexually frustrated.

Where cities have used liquor licensing powers and other pressures to keep "topless-bottomless shows" out of their boundaries, such shows have often moved to highways between the cities. This presents some inconvenience to the proprietors and patrons of such places, but it does strike a workable compromise between total censorship and the commercial blight and creepy atmosphere that typically accompanies the skin trade. Similar community licensing or zoning authority could easily be extended to other avowedly pornographic enterprises. Anyone who wished to establish an "adult" bookstore or theater would then have to conform to certain standards regarding offensive signing, and would have to locate in specific areas. The porn vendors on Times Square, for example, might be prohibited from scribbling "Live Sex" on their windows, and be required to relocate to, say, the Bowery.

The community is clearly the optimal decision-making unit for drawing the line between racy and raunchy, because community standards take "neighborhood effects" into account, while allowing for a variety of choices between different social environments. "Banned in Boston" is a principle far less subject to abuse than either setting national standards for obscenity, or setting no standards at all.

In *Economics and the Art of Controversy* (1958), John Kenneth Galbraith warned conservatives not to exaggerate their objections to statist interventions lest they lose their credibility. Surely liberals need the same lesson regarding the Mario Savio syndrome of identifying "free speech" with the right to offend others. Yelling "fire" in a crowded auditorium is not a whole lot different from peddling the hot stuff in a crowded city. A society has a perfect right to circumscribe the boundaries of individual choice when those choices interfere with the lives of others. Those who would be the first to object to an unsightly hamburger joint in the middle of a scenic area seem to have no objection to a schlock shop peddling porn in someone else's neighborhood. It's hypocritical at best, and quite inconsiderate. □

Thomas H. Etzold and B.W. Menning

American Strategy in the Nuclear Age

THE REVOLUTIONARY age of nuclear strategy has raised anew the oldest, most basic question of foreign policy, that of the relation between force and diplomacy. Paradoxically, the more powerful weapons become, the more reluctant people are to employ them. In the thermonuclear era, that reluctance has seemed almost an imperative, so that people have wondered whether war can still be a rational policy alternative, whether any goals have sufficient validity and importance to require their attainment through nuclear conflict. Hardly anyone today maintains that war represents merely the extremity of political recourse, or even, as at times in the past, a casual or desirable alternative far short of the extreme.

The relation between force and diplomacy has been the subject of repeated debate in post-1945 American foreign policy. In the period from 1947 to 1950, massive failure to limit Soviet expansion and to construct a congenial postwar order occasioned initial assessments of that question deep in the confidential recesses of the American bureaucracy. A decade later the question again dominated discussion, partly because of the new Soviet ability to carry nuclear destruction to the United States and partly as a result of an increasingly activist American foreign policy. In the early 1970s, as the war wound down in Southeast Asia, Americans were examining the question again. For the third time in twenty-five years, the United States is in search of a national strategy; as in the past the debate and its conclusions will define the nature of subsequent American foreign policy.

The first period of questioning about national strategy in the aftermath of the bomb occurred two short years after the United States had demonstrated for all the world its conclusive strategic power at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. By 1947 the confidence American leaders had derived from the atomic monopoly had diminished. Foreign policy goals had been simple to define, hard to achieve. Americans had hoped to avoid the outbreak of a third world war and to prevent Soviet and communist expansion. By 1947 American failure in the latter regard was more than obvious; it was disturbing and ominous. During the next three years, as American leaders ip debated national strategies, impressive new failures in China and a potentially disastrous loss of security inherent in Soviet acquisition of the bomb were to provoke reexamination of the relation between force and diplomacy, in this case the American nuclear monopoly and the American intention to inhibit Soviet expansion.

Obviously, the atomic monopoly of 1945–1949 was insufficient to stop the Soviets in Eastern Europe, or the communists in China, despite Truman's aggressive posturing and veiled threats. The bomb as the only backstop to policy had proven inflexible, and lack of conventional forces threatened to paralyze American negotiators. During Marshall's tenure as Secretary of State, many negotiators warned of the injury that would result from massive and overhasty demobilization. The old soldier himself grew frustrated and impatient over the rigidity of his negotiating position: ". . . when I was Secretary of State I was being pressed constantly . . . to give the Russians hell. . . . I was getting the same appeal in relation to the Far East and China. At that time my facilities for giving them hell—and I am a soldier and know something about the ability to give hell—was 1-1/3 divisions over the entire United States. That is quite a proposition when you deal with somebody with over 260 and you have 1-1/3."

After a few months under Marshall the State Department concluded that the United States needed to increase its conventional military forces. The Policy Planning Staff, led by Paul Nitze, recommended "a major reconsideration of national strategy." At about the same time the newly formed National Security Council reached similar conclusions, and with participants from State and Defense the NSC initiated discussions which culminated more than two years later in the famous NSC-68 proposals for large increases in conventional forces.

Adoption of the containment policy in mid-1947 almost ensured that such recommendations would emerge from any consideration of political-strategic necessity. The State Department had explicitly stated that the main reason the United States needed to maintain armed strength was to furnish "support for our political position" —that is, containment. For the first time in postwar years, it became clear that a massive strategic threat would not guarantee Soviet amenability, that Americans could not halt Soviet expansion or turn Soviet probes except by meeting them one by one as and when they appeared and by employing varieties of limited counterforce.

After NSC-68 appeared in spring 1950, the United States developed a strategy combining massive retaliation and primitive flexible response. The Truman Administration, and the Eisenhower-Dulles Administration after it, continued to rely on massive strategic nuclear air power in potential direct confrontation with the Soviet Union. At the same time, both administrations developed the conventional alternative to nuclear war first used extensively

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in the Korean police action, though clearly foreshadowed in the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1948–1949.

Many writers have recognized the essential continuity in policy between the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations without realizing the extensive continuity in strategy as well. The emphasis on massive retaliation of the Dulles-Eisenhower years was the public continuation of Truman's reliance on nuclear air power in direct conflict with the Soviet Union. The applications of conventional force received less publicity, but perhaps should have received more, for to the creation of conventional forces and regional defense organizations (both of which continued under Eisenhower) Dulles and Eisenhower added new (to Americans), subtle, and increasingly disreputable non-nuclear modes of forcible coercion. These resulted, for example, in the conventional intervention in Lebanon in 1958, the continuing deployment of conventional land and sea forces in and around Taiwan, the overthrow of governments in Iraq and Guatemala, the attempted subversion of the Indonesian government, and the erection of a satellite government in southeast Asia.

While the Eisenhower Administration was working out in practice some implications of the containment policy, academic observers of foreign relations were exploring the implications of policy in the New Age. Their conclusions and suggestions would initiate the second great debate on national strategy in the Cold War. Henry Kissinger, along with Herman Kahn and General Maxwell Taylor, substantially influenced the development of the McNamara Doctrine, the almost infinitely expanded flexible response of the 1960s. Kissinger and Kahn considered the relation of force and diplomacy abstractly, and then with "ruthless precision" elucidated the logical imperatives for policy.

In the nuclear age, Kissinger argued, the security of geographical isolation which provided time for threat analysis and defensive preparation were no longer elements of the American position. A nation without those advantages, traditional for Americans, could not afford to wait for threats to develop unambiguously. A nation lacking such a margin of safety must conduct more "precautionary policy. It cannot permit a significant change in the balance of forces." The balance of forces and the strategic position and security of the United States could now be upset in a variety of ways, not only military, but political and psychological. "The age of the hydrogen bomb is also the age of internal subversion, of intervention by volunteers, of domination through political and psychological warfare. . . . Moreover, nuclear technology makes it possible, for the first time in history, to shift the balance of power solely through developments *within* the territory of another sovereign state."

Kissinger continued: "At a time when we have never been stronger, we have had to learn that power which is not clearly related to the objectives for which it is to be employed may merely serve to paralyze the will. . . . If the Soviet bloc can present its challenges in less than all-out form . . . it . . . will then pose the appalling dilemma of whether we are willing to commit suicide to prevent encroachments, which do not, each in itself, seem to threaten our existence directly but which may be steps on the road to our ultimate destruction. No more urgent task confronts American policy than to bring our power into balance with the issues for which we are most likely to have to contend" (*Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, 1957).

Kissinger's analysis subtly extended the philosophy and practice of power politics and containment. It foreshadowed, even required, a thoroughgoing American commitment to conflict and interventionism that finds its ideological, though not its practical, parallel in the Truman Doctrine. As the Kennedy Administration expanded American conventional forces, mobile reserves, helicopter, airborne, naval and marine forces, and developed large counterinsurgency and special (guerrilla) forces, a contemporary political analyst praised the McNamara Doctrine of flexible response for making containment "at last a viable, detailed defense policy for the nuclear age."

Although U.S. policy during the Eisenhower-Dulles years had never excluded a resort to non-nuclear conflict, the rhetoric of massive retaliation and "brinksmanship" had both obscured the acquisition of real flexibility and hindered the development of a coherent and rational national strategy. By bridging the gap between posture and theory, the Kennedy-McNamara doctrine of flexible response realized a new consistency in strategy. At the heart of the doctrine was a heroic appeal to rationality, an appeal which placed a high—and probably unwarranted—degree of confidence in the ability of decision-makers and their advisers to comprehend, plan for, and ultimately control situations requiring the use of force. Scholars both inside and outside of government provided the intellectual foundation for the new consistency when they optimistically thought and wrote in terms of "ladders of escalation," or paradigms, whose rungs marked nearly every stage of conceivable conflict ranging from an exchange of harsh invective to all-out nuclear war.

Under Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, the elaboration of flexible response represented an attempt to restore rationality to strategic planning in an era when the vast power of weaponry seemed to have rendered war—the use of unlimited force in pursuit of policy—"unthinkable." In the language of strategic studies in the early 1960s, cost-risk calculations formed the basis of policy planning—an approach and terminology reminiscent of European, and especially German, strivings in the late nineteenth century. The cost-risk approach of the McNamara years constituted an attempt to realize under modern conditions the attractive environment in which Clausewitz's famous dictum would be valid: when risks could be calculated and costs foreseen and managed, war would comprise only the modest extension of diplomatic pressure. As the State Department had concluded somewhat earlier, the *raison d'être* of capabilities and ready forces was the support they could lend to American political postures.

During McNamara's tenure, the Department of Defense attempted to bring rationality into both sides of the cost-risk calculation. On the cost side of the equation, perhaps the most notable development was the systematic application of modern business management techniques to spending, procurement, and planning. Since the beginning of World War II, when the question of the military budget had first attracted more than the usual amount of public attention, various administrations had experienced the frustration of wrestling with the problem of allocating limited monetary and manpower resources within an even more voracious defense organization. McNamara's whiz kids subjected the department to searching scrutiny, employing cost-effectiveness accounting and systems analysis in a major effort to restore the military appetite to manageability and to bring efficiency, logic, and order to security management and planning.

In the nuclear age it was even more essential to cut risks than to cut costs. How could one think of supporting political positions through forces in being or forces in use in an era when massive and intolerable nuclear exchange loomed so darkly? American planners seemed to have found an answer when to the traditional flexibility apparent in the Eisenhower years they added nontraditional flexibilities and a doctrine which provided harmony and order in the convergence of power and politics. The essence of risk-cutting lay in avoiding confrontation with adverse nuclear powers, thereby keeping the possibility of nuclear exchange remote. By introducing subtleties, variations, and extra steps into the "ladders of escalation," flexible response seemed to remove the imminence of the nuclear threat. And the development of unconventional forces enhanced the ability of the United States to confront its adversaries by indirection, through the sublimated great power conflict which surfaced in the third world under circumstances requiring decidedly new capabilities and responses.

To complement the search for rational order during the Kennedy-McNamara years the Defense Department greatly expanded programs for training and strengthening the military and police establishments of "friendly" governments. The chaos of change and revolution in the third world threatened the stability fundamental to the kind of predictability vital to planning and managing national security and foreign relations in order to minimize risks. By providing material and advisory assistance in support of counterinsurgency and internal development operations, the Department stressed the nonconventional dimension of flexible response at

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a time when subversive movements defied the more conventional applications of counterforce.

In the early 1960s the new harmony between capability and philosophy led to the acquisition of a stronger and more diversified nuclear deterrent, as well as the bolstering of conventional and nonconventional forces, but not to the planner's utopia that some people had expected. In the most important test case, Vietnam, it became apparent that many elements of the new flexibility and rationality were either flawed or of limited value. In actuality, modern business techniques possessed limitations. While they were of great assistance in planning resource allocation, for instance, they were much less useful as aids in the management of violence. Flexible response as doctrine was supposed to guarantee the United States a wide range of alternatives either in ascending or descending the ladder of escalation in any given extension of politics beyond diplomacy to force. In theory, decision-makers retained the option of expanding or curtailing the level of force or engagement in a manner that corresponded to their interpretation of the cost-risk, and especially the cost-effect or cost-benefit calculation. When cost exceeded potential benefit, or when risks rose too high, one could deescalate or even disengage.

In practice, American involvement in Vietnam demonstrated that in some instances flexible response was flexible only in one direction, and that the ladder of escalation was in fact one-way, always leading upward. The costs of involvement quickly outran even the most extravagant estimates of potential benefit, partly because of the prominent effect of a factor thus far omitted from cost calculations, that of domestic reaction to and constraints on foreign military policy. In Vietnam the United States found itself applying amounts of force which would have brought many conventional enemies to their knees. Faced with a war in which nerves and obstinacy weighed more heavily than supplies and firepower, in which almost no amount of force would suffice short of that required completely to destroy the enemy, the prudent practitioner of flexible response would have chosen to disengage. Paradoxically as high costs began to outrun potential advantages and to encourage reconsideration of involvement, they also grew to represent a level of investment, of sacrifice, which was closely allied with national pride. Just as a gambler on a losing streak tends to throw good money after bad, decision-makers could not make a "peace without honor" which they would be able to justify only by overlooking the American casualties and expended resources.

The flaw in the philosophy of flexible response was a failure to understand the fact that violence possesses its own dynamic, a kind of internal logic that is impervious to systematic and rational analysis. Former Under Secretary of State George Ball understood the logic behind escalation when he wrote, "It is in the nature of escalation that each move passes the option to the other side, while at the same time the party which seems to be losing will be tempted to keep raising the ante. . . . Once on the tiger's back we cannot be sure of picking the place to dismount." Expressions such as Ball's raised distinct doubts about the possibility of employing systematic and graduated force to obtain political victory. They might have made decision-makers somewhat more reluctant in resorting to force, had they not come too early in the Vietnam experience to be the product of observation rather than of prophetic insight.

Although the Vietnam experience has tended to discredit flexible response, the general concept has survived in American-European policy. There were, after all, good reasons why the doctrine had not worked well in Vietnam. Long before the end of American involvement, people were looking for and finding explanations for that failure, and there was overwhelming agreement that modern high-technology industrial states were not equipped for prolonged war in an insurgency framework against developing states. Conventional modes of warfare availed little or nothing against guerrillas, and the less conventional components of America's new flexibility could produce only limited success.

That severe limitation of success coupled with the special difficulties of warfare under insurgency conditions spurred the reorientation of American policy in part capsulized in the Nixon Doctrine. Thwarted

in Southeast Asia, tired of great investment with little return, Nixon and Kissinger reevaluated the advantages of subliminal confrontation and displaced aggression and concluded that the United States would do better to negotiate directly with the other superpowers over questions and areas essential to American policy rather than to fight them indirectly in areas of marginal and submarginal interest and significance. In an era of increasing concern over resource allocation, peripheral conflict had become a luxury if not an extravagance. The nontraditional modes of warfare developed to fight such conflicts in the third world likewise appeared to have been luxuries rather than the essence of flexibility.

In contrast, Europe represented a context in which American interests were far greater and more clearly defined. More important, in Europe the elements of modern technological warfare could be effective and influential, and American power rather than being dispersed and dissipated could be concentrated. It is no surprise that at the center of the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy was a return of attention and interest to Western Europe, the developed industrial area of the world, where American economic and political interests were strongest, and where American diplomatic and military capabilities promised to be relevant and effective. The search for balance in Europe and between the East and West, represented in the cautious advance on the German problem, SALT I, and the upcoming MBFR (Mutual Balanced Force Reduction) negotiations, signified a continuation of the attempt to create stability and thus predictability and order in the precise arena in which the gyrating instability of the early Cold War had originated.

In the reconstituted European context, the doctrine of flexible response still remained valid, even integral. Had not the greatest fears of nuclear confrontation arisen from the terms of confrontation and competition in Europe? Had not the security and integrity of Western Europe been among the few clear interests declared in advance to be worth nuclear exchange? At this moment the wild proliferation of capabilities in the Kennedy-McNamary years stood out as the extravagant luxury it had in fact been. Nixon and Kissinger had come full circle, back to the flexible response of 1957–1960, curiously enough the years in which Kissinger's writing had stimulated the exaggerated developments of the early 1960s. The return to such a posture in Europe represents as it did in years past an attempt to escape the continuing logic of the balance of terror, to retain a sphere in which force could be the rational, usable extension of practical politics, as it had been for the *Realpolitiker* of the nineteenth century.

At least, one might say, the return to European concerns and to the discarding of fancy varieties of capability may prevent future expenditure of blood and treasure in trivial and remote causes. The reorientation of American policy, the moderation of goals, terms, and areas of conflict augurs the return of perspective, the final triumph of rationality in the attempt to link force and diplomacy.

Unhappily, this final triumph can also muddle our understanding of the very real difference between force and diplomacy. Insofar as flexible response has represented an attempt to avoid the mindless, uncontrollable violence and destruction of nuclear holocaust, it is both desirable and necessary. Flexible response as developed since the early 1950s, and especially in the Kenendy-McNamara years, was intended to minimize the dichotomy between peace and war, between diplomacy and force, a dichotomy that seemed restrictively and dangerously obsolete in the nuclear age. Furthermore, flexible response eased the overt and increasing competition between Washington diplomats on the one hand and warriors on the other for the dominant voice in national policy planning. In aligning the techniques of persuasion along an unbroken continuum, a ladder of escalation, the ideologues of the new strategic era blurred the dividing line between diplomacy and warfare, in part to permit compromise between the competitors for influence over national policy.

But flexible response was developed in the era and under the aura of a containment strategy. It was as much intended to make force a deliberate extension of diplomatic technique as to stave off nuclear exchange. Flexible response did not begin with Kissinger and Kahn in 1957, though

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they greatly enlarged its terms and provided missing components of theory. The capability and subsequently the doctrine of flexible response grew out of the revival of conventional forces following the recommendations of NSC-68, coincident with Soviet acquisition of the bomb.

Thus diplomacy and war remain dichotomous, qualitatively different, because of the internal and irrational dynamic of violence, which is no mystical characteristic. The use of force invites counterforce, as witness the genesis of the American containment policy of the late 1940s. When force meets counterforce, both initiator and respondent become victims, and victims of violence, the objects of threats and applied force, lose the clearheaded objectivity necessary to read the cost-rist and cost-benefit calculations of a national security manager. It is understandably easier to be rational in the use of force than in the experience of it. In such a context the apparent deception involved in a Gulf of Tonkin incident becomes less significant than the experience of having been shot at, whatever the provocation, whatever the context. When the first man on each side has died, the internal logic of violence may wrest control of subsequent events from the once rational decision-maker. When there has been cost or expenditure, there must be an accounting, and when that cost is measured in blood, who can confidently and willingly make that accounting?

In the current formulation of American foreign political and military relations, there is a basis for optimism, just as there is for reserved concern. The replacement of a containment policy by a concept of balance has already demonstrated its potential for a reduction of tension, hostility, insecurity, and instability. But the retention of flexible response as the doctrinal basis for policy is less reassuring. In the 1960s, the doctrine of flexible response, by diminishing the significance of the resort to force, became an invitation to intervention and war. With the Vietnam war so close, it is hard to believe that flexible response, even in its more confined European application, will not invite another misstep. For the decision-makers of a generation of peace, the resort to force cannot remain a simple or logical extension of diplomacy. It is, and should remain, a distinguishable last resort. □

The Nation's Pulse



by Benjamin Stein

Solzhenitsyn: His Meaning for Americans

AT GREAT PERSONAL cost, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn has given the American people a lesson of incomparable value and timeliness. The lesson is the importance of perspective in assessing our American political system and its prospects.

Solzhenitsyn has just allowed publication of his book entitled *The Gulag Archipelago 1918–1956*. It is a comprehensive history of the Soviet concentration camp and terror system. The "Gulag" was the administration of the concentration camps which spread across Russia like islands in an archipelago. The history goes from 1918 to 1956 and is told largely out of the mouths of the survivors and nonsurvivors of the camps, the arrests, and the tortures.

It tells a story of how 1984 arrived in Russia in 1918 with the terror decreed by Lenin. That terror surged through time in wave after wave directed at non-Bolshevik revolutionaries, landed peasants, intellectuals, army officers, scientists, and every kind of nationality which ever crossed Lenin or Stalin.

Solzhenitsyn argues that the terror was not an aberration from Lenin's saintliness, brought on by Stalin. He shows that terror was woven inextricably into the Soviet system from its first days, and has never left that system. The Soviet crimes against humanity, he points out, in sheer number, exceed the Nazis'. Whole nationalities and classes were exterminated—often upon a whim.

And, the writer says that it is as if Bormann and Goebbels were still running things. Persons who were intimately associated with the most barbaric forms of terror against the innocent still flourish in positions of power in the Soviet state. The people who rose through the murder of the innocent live in villas and are driven in limousines. Trials of even the most vicious Stalin era criminals simply do not take place—a shocking comparison with even the sorry record of trials of Nazi criminals.

Solzhenitsyn shows how the system killed its victims not only physically, but first in spirit. Knowledge that the whole nation was in fear made the resistance of any individual seem futile. Thus, resistance to even the most outrageously unfair and brutal acts did not materialize.

The book is obviously full of meaning for those few Russians who will be able to read it. But for the world at large, its greater significance will be in the American reaction to it.

It says to Americans that with all of the problems of our American system, we would do well to look at what our chief political and military rival has to offer.

The book could hardly have come at a more opportune moment. The American people have been so buffeted with news stories about how bad our system is (supposedly) because of the Vietnam war, the Watergate events, the gasoline shortages, that polls have shown new lows of despair about the fundamental moral strength of our country.

The Gulag Archipelago should tell us that even if the worst of all the allegations about our system are true—the Vietnam war was a cruel misadventure, bungling and immoral men were operating within the White House, the rewards of the economic and judicial system are distributed unfairly—that is all trifling by comparison with a pressing alternative—the Soviet system.

The American system faces serious and real challenges. Facing up to them will make America stronger, not weaker. But what can and will weaken America is the kind of self-doubt which is rubbed into the American system and psyche by an obsessive dwelling upon faults, real and often imagined, in American life.

It is bad, even very bad, for people using the power of government to eavesdrop on others' conversations. It should be stopped. But our gain will be nil if we flagellate ourselves to weakness while those without shame make themselves stronger. It will do no lasting good to make our system hemorrhage to the point that those who feel no compunction about the slaughter of the millions will overcome, bit by bit, around the world.

If we make our President so weak and powerless by harping on whether he knew that a certain conversation was held on a certain date that he cannot lead us to stand against a system that starves men to death because they satirize the government, we will not have done a service to the cause of law.

Solzhenitsyn shows us that even in what some consider a dim hour for our system, that system is still a beacon for the rest of the world.

He shows us another kind of perspective too. Who in the world can match the bravery of the men and women who defy the Soviet system from within? Theirs is a life of unrelieved torment for what is to them no more than an abstraction—freedom of speech and thought. For their efforts there are no fund-raisers in Manhattan co-ops, no network television, no worshipful mass following.

For their service to a condition which we consider fundamental, they are estranged from their compatriots, impoverished, jailed, beaten, made insane by drugs and conditioning, and finally hounded to their deaths in brutal work camps. If we lost what we now have, who among us would suffer as much to get it back? □

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Leslie Lenkowsky

The Next Step in Party Reform

WHATEVER THE REAL motives behind them, the reforms of party structure which the Democrats have undertaken may be seen historically as the latest phase of the American quest to perfect its political organizations. As any high school civics student knows, the Constitution makes no provision for parties, while in speeches and pamphlets the early leaders of the Republic made known their worries of the dangers of factionalism. Ever since tradition, necessity, or pure expedience forced partisanship upon many of these same men, American politicians have displayed little reluctance to create, restructure, or abandon parties. Even electoral success does not quench this passion, as we will be reminded when Republicans begin to install "improved" criteria for delegate selection before their 1976 convention.

With a fine sense of historical irony, proposals to reform American parties, for the last hundred years or so, have frequently found models in their British counterparts. Scholars and serious journalists (as well as future presidents) have admired the way these political organizations supposedly command the allegiance of their members in office so as to provide a basis for electoral choice and the capacity for governmental action. Of course, the apparently greater efficiency of the British party system stems in part from the differences between government by Cabinet and by President and Congress. But the formal checks and balances of the national government could just as well serve to buttress any argument for making American parties more disciplined and programmatic.

Contemporary fashions of party reform generally have two objectives: making the party membership more representative of the electorate and giving their preferences greater weight with the elected. (The nineteenth-century interest in making the parties less corrupt has heretofore had few takers.) While public attention was focussed on maneuvers to seek or avoid quotas, changes of a different sort were also being discussed and adopted. Thus, in 1974 (tentatively scheduled for December 6, 7, and 8 in Kansas City), the Democratic Party will hold a conference on policy and organization; the machinery of its national committee is also being strengthened. Both of these steps are designed to give the party some coherence in the four years between presidential campaigns. Even at best, these reforms will hardly make American parties into imitations of the British ideal, but they are clearly attempts to move towards what Austin Ranney has called the model of "responsible party government," where a group of activists will adopt a program which all candidates running under its banner are committed to support if elected.

Most discussions of this model, however, have a curiously one-sided quality. The failings of the American party system are usually set against the virtues of the ideal one. While the practical difficulties of implementing such a system in the United States may be cited, or the value of existing arrangements defended, the argument is infrequently enlightened by consideration of how ostensibly responsible parties do operate. Disciplined and programmatic parties may behave quite differently in practice than in theory.

The annual conferences of the Labour and Conservative Parties, held during the first two weeks of October in Blackpool, offer one relevant way of checking. (Britain's "third" party, the Liberal, again showing signs of resurgence in the opinion polls, devoted much of its conference to trying to prove it *is* a party.) One set of conferences, of course, may not be typical, although an election within the next year is a sobering possibility. And even though few Britons regard their parties as ideal, the basic features of their conferences may suggest what to expect from the Democrats' venture this year.

Perhaps what is most notable is that for neither the governing Conservative Party nor the opposition Labour is the annual conference a policy-making body. Indeed, for the former there is hardly any pretense. Its three days of meetings consisted of debates on resolutions chosen by the national leadership from among those submitted by local party associations. Even the speakers were selected by the leadership and when they concluded, one of the party's ministers summarizes the proceedings, much like a communal elder recording the sense of the meeting. A vote is taken, overwhelmingly supporting the leadership. (The one exception this year was on a capital punishment resolution, which the national leadership had already declared would not be binding, since the issue was one of conscience.) Even so, the resolution thus adopted is not binding on the party's delegation in Parliament.

Owing, perhaps, to its traditions or to the temperament of its members, there is a bit more suspense at the Labour Party conference, but the result is hardly different. The national executive has less control over the motions debated (which are amendments or policy suggestions for its published national program) or the speakers. Though the leadership can win most votes, bargaining is necessary and the outcome may be in doubt even on an important issue, such as policy towards the Common Market. The key battle, however, is on whether the conference resolutions shall be binding on the Labour Party's members in Parliament. This year, as in the past, after a private session the Party's elected officials preserved their independence.

If the party conferences have little to do with policy-making, they have even less to do with nominations. Especially among Conservatives, those attending are as much spokesmen as delegates. Though all are paid-up members of their parties, they come to Blackpool representing trade unions, youth groups, and so on, as well as local party associations. Except as campaign workers, they may not even be active in local politics. In any event, the really important officeholders, the leaders and senior members of the party delegations in Parliament, are chosen by their own caucus. Labour conferees do choose a national party executive committee and may be called to account for their selections when they return home. But a system of voting that Mayor Daley might envy gives a hereditary character to the results.

What, then, do these yearly gatherings accomplish? Manifestly, they are a way of putting a party's case to the country between elections. The tedious debates, the impassioned speeches, and the various "fringe" group meetings amount to an expression of collective and dissident values within the party. While the week's events may sharpen issues, they are at least as likely to reinforce consensus; though spirits may run high, both on and off the convention floor, the overall mood is one of relief. Have the party's leaders failed to communicate properly with their followers? A promise to try harder is made. Has the hallowed commitment to a free health service, or free enterprise, waned? Most assuredly, the nation is told, it has not. On the platform sits the leadership, the present or future government, listening to those upon whose efforts they rely, speaking to those whose votes they desire, and guarding their freedom to govern.

This year's conference of the Labour Party excelled at this. Even before it officially opened, a widely publicized demand for a commitment to nationalize twenty-five companies revealed that the party's socialist tide was again cresting. If the conference reaffirmed the major tenets of the party's traditional creed just before the election, a Labour victory could be viewed as popular endorsement of left-wing policies. After a week in which rank-and-file and leaders vied to take the most radical stance, the left was jubilant. "Don't let anyone say that we on the Left have not done everything in our power to unite the party for the election and we have every right to demand that they accept its meaning," proclaimed Michael Foot, a leading socialist, as he warned his fellow members of Parliament against backsliding. But it was also Foot's forceful oratory that brought jubilation to the leadership by carrying the day on the motion to preserve their independence from conference decisions. So, as the delegates sang "The Red Flag" to bring the gathering to a close, pundits pondered what, if anything, had really been effected.

To be sure, for journalists and politicians to be thinking—and talking—about the party's prospects was no small accomplishment. In fact, as with American party conventions, the nation's political elite may be the only important audience. The annual gatherings serve as trials by ordeal for those who would be leaders. On nationwide television, a junior minister may defend a controversial policy or a prospective parliamentary candidate may declaim on the

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day's leading issues. In the middle of a lengthy response to debate may come official hint of a new party policy, or electoral strategy, or perhaps even a change in the composition of the hierarchy. In the morning, and over the next few weeks, judgment will be passed on these initiatives.

The Conservative Party conference typically provides for much of this sort of communication. Early in the week, a young Secretary of State for Housing delivered a key address on the government's programs in that area, perhaps a harbinger of a new and more important portfolio. Towards the close of the conference, the long-awaited remarks by the Government's man in Belfast, rumored to be in line for promotion to deputy leader, were hailed as "Churchillian" by a favorable press. A noisy row was touched off by some parenthetical remarks by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, which revealed that the leadership's tolerance for right-wing critics within the party had reached an end. But the impact of this and the other events was more upon a few within the hall than the many without.

Being the party in government, the Conservatives are in a somewhat better position for these maneuvers. They have a record in office to expound and more than partisan import adheres to the statements of their leaders. (Just prior to the beginning of this year's conference, Prime Minister Heath unveiled Phase Three of the Government's anti-inflation program, effectively channeling economic debate for the rest of the week.) An Opposition party, such as Labour, has to be more circumspect. While satisfying its supporters, it must be wary of taking stands that will be irrelevant or embarrassing at election time. Though the party of the British working class usually seems unwilling to let this risk constrain its proceedings, nonetheless, annual policy conferences may, curiously, offer more advantages for the ins than the outs.

There are times, of course, when the yearly seaside gatherings have significance for the party or even for the government. A division within the leadership may be brought to a boil, or a debate on an issue of principle forced, producing pledges too firm to avoid. Moreover, other portions of the party apparatus—the national executive committees, the permanent party offices, and so on—are active between conferences. In ways subtle and direct, they can influence the parliamentary leadership, though the reverse may be at least as likely. Finally, in a country where precedent and common sense substitute for a written constitution, it is always possible for the party conferences to evolve into policy-making bodies.

But, for a simple reason, this is improbable. Even in Britain where formal party membership is much more extensive than in the United States, the delegates to the annual conferences come from a public considerably smaller than the potential electorate. Despite crucial party support at campaign time, a successful candidate owes his ultimate allegiance to his constituency as a whole. Even Labour members of Parliament officially sponsored by trade unions, though sensitive to the interests of their patrons, retain their prerogative to act in accordance with their own conception of constituency interests. This view may not always be correct, nor even bear on a particular issue, but must always be considered.

The great compromise with this principle of constituency representation in Britain occurs at the level of the party in Parliament. Whether in power or in opposition, only the Parliamentary Party can claim a national following; it, not the party assembled in annual conference, is collectively responsible to the electorate. Similarly, a member of Commons also owes allegiance to his Parliamentary Party's program, a conception of the national interest, not diverse local ones. The effect of these arrangements is to insulate him from the demands of both constituency and mass party. But, as a result, perhaps the most perilous act a British politician can perform is to stand apart from his colleagues in Parliament. Rarely is his career so promising afterwards.

Thus, the disciplined and programmatic character of British parties arises not from the connection between a mass party and its elected officials, but from the relationship among the officeholders. To be sure, the parliamentary organizations of Labour and Conservative members must be careful to avoid a breach with their party followers and it is this necessity which adds meaning to the gatherings in Blackpool and the other party activities during the year. Yet in the end, the degree of influence of the mass party depend chiefly on the susceptibility of the one in Commons, for it alone can lay claim to a national constituency.

It follows that adding annual party conferences to American political institutions will not in itself move the country much nearer to "responsible party government." More enlightened discussions of policy options by the Democratic Party may be desirable for a variety of reasons, but they will not have much impact on the actions of nationally elected officials. Only if efforts were also directed at organizing these officeholders would the conditions for party government along British lines be created. But the current reforms, though adopted on the recommendation of groups chaired by congressmen and senators, are notably unconcerned with doing so.

An explanation of this omission may lie elsewhere in the reform movement. Making representatives and senators subject to a congressional caucus would necessarily weaken their relationship to their own constituencies. Yet, practical problems of the American electoral system aside, reformers interested in the first instance in democratizing the national party are likely to have little affection for changes that would increase the gap between the elected official and the voter. Perhaps this is the key obstacle to a more responsible system: a traditionally ambivalent attitude which would have parties become more effective instruments of governing while behaving less like parties. □

Letter from a Whig



by C. Bascom Slemp

No Excuse to Cop Out

"Point of Order"

(WASHINGTON) — Before Congress could adjourn for its Christmas recess, Bellicose Bella struck again. Bella, of course, is New York's *femme fatale*, Congressperson Ms. Bella Abzug.

During recent House debate on H.R. 11450 (the Energy Emergency Act—still tied up in Congress) Congressman John Dingell (D-Mich.) offered a floor amendment which would have prohibited fuel allocation for busing beyond neighborhood schools. Rising in all her Elysian splendor, Ms. Abzug called Dingell's actions—in no uncertain terms—racist and demagogic. Asking how we could allow our children to become sacrificial lambs of scandalous demogoguery (expressed again in less than *genteel* language), the Abzug outburst was halted when Congressman Bauman (R-Md.) requested a point of order. Bauman thought the remarks of the "gentlewoman in the well" (one wonders whether that was to be taken both literally and figuratively in this public parliamentary interplay) violated the "rules of the House and impugned the motives of the gentleman from Michigan, (Mr. Dingell)." House Speaker Carl Albert was then reportedly carried onto the floor of the House to rule whether or not the gentlewoman from New York was, in fact, out of order. The Chair ruled against Ms. Abzug; her language was stricken from the *Record*, and she was prohibited from participating in floor debate for twenty-four hours—cruel and unusual punishment which undoubtedly deserves to be declared unconstitutional.

CRYP

For young people not yet turned off by

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politics, Morton Blackwell, a long-time Washington-based activist in conservative politics, has designed a way to get them involved in major political campaigns. The acronym for his creation is CRYP, the Committee for Responsible Youth Politics, a training program for youth coordinators in congressional campaigns. CRYP did not get under way until late in 1972, but it was furiously active by election time. Thirty-one people went through Blackwell's program and CRYP gave significant help to sixteen campaigns (providing both money and youth coordinators). Successful CRYP Senate campaigns included Dewey Bartlett (Oklahoma), Carl Curtis (Nebraska), Jesse Helms (North Carolina), Jim McLure (Idaho), and William Scott (Virginia). On the House side successful races included Dave Treen (Louisiana), Ken Robinson (Virginia), Trent Lott (Mississippi), Steve Symms (Idaho), and Ed Young (South Carolina). In 1973's off-year elections CRYP contributed $1500 and a trained youth coordinator to Don Young's successful House race in Alaska, as well as $3500 and a youth coordinator for the successful congressional election of Robert Bauman in Maryland.

And CRYP shows no sign of slowing down. For the 1974 elections CRYP has expanded its budget and scheduled nine intensive weekend schools in Florida, Indiana, California, Minnesota, Montana, Washington D.C., New York, Lousiana, and Connecticut for youth coordinators around the country. According to Blackwell, these training seminars will cover all aspects of youth campaigning, from membership tables to election-day activities. Each trainee will go through a total of twenty-three hours of intensive instruction. For dedicated and able young people, insists Blackwell, this can be a first step in a political career.

"Public Monitor"

Another program which is just getting off the ground is Public Monitor. OEO's former Acting Director, Howard Phillips, will head this new American Conservative Union program.

In a recent mailing M. Stanton Evans, the Chairman of the American Conservative Union, wrote that the Public Monitor will lobby in Congress against the "waste and misuse of the taxpayer's dollar." But Public Monitor promises to be much more. Besides lobbying Phillips intends to inform th public through a Citizen's News Service of bureaucratic misdeeds. Public Monitor will also include a National Committee of Correspondence (through which the public at large can channel into Washington local examples of bureaucratic abuse), a Committee of Volunteer Lawyers (who will initiate taxpayer suits against improper bureaucratic activity), and a Speaker's Bureau (which will provide speakers to local groups to talk about some of the bureaucratic horror stories and explain the purpose of Public Monitor). Evans and Phillips see Public Monitor as only the beginning of what they call the "long-range battle to restore our free institutions to the control of the American people." The program needs money and volunteers and there is the possibility of a summer intern program beginning in 1974. For people like Blackwell, Evans, and Phillips it is quite clear that Watergate has provided no excuse to "cop out." Instead it reflects the need for greater interest and greater participation on the part of the American public. □

Book Review

Kissinger: Portrait of a Mind

by Stephen H. Graubard
W.W. Norton $7.95

AMERICAN FOREIGN policy under Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger seems above all to have been concerned with the search for a stable international order. In his *Kissinger: Portrait of a Mind*, Stephen Graubard paraphrases Kissinger's assertion of twenty years ago that "peace could not be made the objective of foreign policy . . . it was the bonus that followed from a properly conceived and intelligently executed policy." Such an intelligent policy was one that recognized whether or not it was possible to achieve a "generally accepted legitimacy," an international agreement "about the nature of workable arrangements and about the permissible aims and methods of foreign policy." If such an agreement were possible, then a wise and responsible statesman would act so as to achieve a stable international order, which alone guarantees peace.

Such has clearly been Kissinger's conception of his efforts as national security advisor to and now as Secretary of State under Richard Nixon. A "stable international order" was not the primary or public goal of earlier American statesmen. Secretaries of State before World War II on the whole saw their task as the avoidance of too great an American entanglement in world affairs. After World War II, Secretaries of State described our task as either the containment or "rollback" of Communism, and the promotion of freedom and democracy throughout the world. President Kennedy's inaugural address was a striking expression of that commitment. Richard Nixon occasionally declaims about coming "generations of peace;" but "peace" is far less inspiring than freedom, and the movement from one to the other tells a good deal about the changes in our view of our international role. A "stable international order" is now the main goal of American foreign policy, and this is a significant departure from the goals of the previous twenty-five years.

The departure such a foreign policy represents may be described as a new maturity in American foreign policy. This new maturity is, I think, on the whole but not unambiguously for the better. It is on the whole for the better because it promises a more sober and responsible foreign policy, one that may approach Kissinger's hopes expressed fifteen years ago for a foreign policy that was adept at "the art of weighing probabilities . . . . grasping the nuances of possibilities." Our new-found maturity is ambiguously for the better because maturity represents a loss of youth, and youth has certain very appealing characteristics, which can impart to it a certain nobility. One characteristic of youth is the hope of significantly changing the world, and the condition of our fellow men in it, for the better. That hope, at least within any reasonable time frame, seems under Kissinger no longer to be the central goal or promise, or even hope of American foreign policy.

Hope is one feature of youth; another is daring. Yet the resounding words of President Kennedy notwithstanding, American foreign policy has never been very daring. This is probably for the best, since daring in the real world is often indistinguishable from recklessness, and great powers should not be reckless. But a country's foreign policy should not be faithful or immature if that country is not going to act on its youthful ambitions. And at some point protesting such ambitions and failing to act can even become a bit despicable; thus, John Foster Dulles. The United States has always been isolationist by geography and temperament. The obligation to take foreign policy seriously since World War II has been seen by most Americans as a necessary evil, as was seen to be our entry into World War II. America's interventions —from noble motives—in Korea and Vietnam were reluctant; they were part of what was seen as a necessary policy of containment.

The logical next step from containment is détente. In fact, we are almost obliged, having followed a policy of containment since World War II, to drop our unfulfillable aspirations and become mature. If basically we are going to accept the status quo, we might as well make it as pleasant and safe as possible. This does not mean that we should not maintain at least military parity with the USSR, help our allies, and help citizens under tyrannical rule as much as possible; it does mean that we have come to recognize the importance of trying to build a "stable international order," one that is relatively secure and peaceful.

This implies a policy of détente *rightly understood*. That is, a mature policy of détente which does not simply transfer our excessive hopes of the past to the new policy of détente. Détente rightly understood

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holds limited hopes for détente—simply to make the world a little safer, and perhaps a little better. And détente rightly understood does not mean an "easier" foreign policy; on the contrary, détente requires considerably more skill and even toughness than a policy of containment. It must be said that President Nixon, if not Secretary Kissinger, has not always made this clear.

As Whittaker Chambers pointed out fifteen years ago, the American conservative position on foreign policy has often been curious. The logic of the Right's opposition to détente on principle leads logically to a demand for a major attempt to change the status quo and thus the risk of war. But if America was unwilling—even when, under Dulles, we were far stronger than the USSR—seriously to risk war for the sake of Hungarians or Czechoslovaks, then opposition to détente is merely willful posturing. One can easily oppose specific details of how we are going about détente; but the conservative often rejects détente on principle while implicitly holding out an unacceptable alternative (unacceptable to the American people, if not in itself unacceptable)—an activist foreign policy which is willing to run risk of major war, a war caused by our rejection of the status quo.

But does the USSR accept the status quo? If not, is it not foolish to pursue détente while the USSR has hostile intentions? In this vein, conservatives have made much of Kissinger's contention that the USSR is no longer a "revolutionary" power. A revolutionary regime is one that does not accept the established international order; further, it is one that is willing to take considerable risks in pursuing its revolutionary goals, to risk even its existence on foreign "adventures." Napoleonic France is the prototype. Whatever the USSR's ultimate or long-range goals, it clearly is not (and has not been) "revolutionary" in the sense that it is willing to take serious risks to increase its borders or its ideological sway. As the Middle East war has shown, it will make trouble wherever it can, in a thoroughly despicable way; but one can retain a wariness and dislike of the USSR and an appreciation of their baseness without precluding mutually advantageous dealings with them, and agreements which serve to such a vague but real purpose as lessening world tension.

That Kissinger's foreign policy does not fit neatly into the traditional splits over U.S. foreign policy (witness the attacks on him from both sides) makes Stephen Graubard's book worth reading. The book is a fine summary and paraphrase of all of Kissinger's writings until 1969. It is no more than that; but that is a useful function, especially if Graubard is correct, as I think he is, in his "very simple preposition that there is a link . . . between what Kissinger wrote in the 1950s and 1960s and what he has been doing since January 20, 1969."

Reading this book, one is struck above all by Kissinger's repeated argument that U.S. foreign policy in the 1950s and 1960s was entirely defensive: "We possessed a doctrine to repel overt aggression, but we could not translate it into a strategy for achieving positive goals." The United States under Dulles, but also under later administrations, had "a policy which seemed incapable to articulate any purpose save that of preventing an expansion of the Soviet sphere." This is an admirable objective, but the utterly defensive nature of the U.S. stance offered the Soviet Union no incentive to negotiate, and no incentive for Soviet concessions. Kissinger wrote in 1957 that the threat of massive retaliation did nothing to "avert the Korean war, the loss of northern Indo-China, the Soviet-Egyptian arm deal, or the Suez crisis."

Under Nixon-Kissinger, the United States has begun to try to do what Kissinger has long argued for, to pursue a positive foreign policy of making what gains are available and reducing tensions as much as possible; since we are not going to make the world safe for democracy, we should at least make it relatively safe.

It is true that the policy of détente is, in a way, a policy of weakness; it is precisely America's weakness, in fact, that may make détente necessary. Lacking the military superiority over the Soviet Union we once had, it seems that our best lever over Soviet actions is no longer so much the threat of force but that of breaking off the economic benefits of détente the Russians genuinely seem to want.

But the American weakness is not just military. To the extent that détente is a policy based on weakness, that is a reflection of the fact that the United States is to a significant degree "naturally" isolationist, and that it might pay the Soviet Union to await a revival of U.S. isolationism. The problematic nature of American willingness to continue to take an active role in world affairs forces any American administration to play from weakness.

The recognition of the weakness of any American bargaining position should obviate some of the conservative criticism of Kissinger, but it does raise one important consideration. Kissinger wrote in 1968 that "the most profound challenge to American policy . . . (would be) philosophical" in the years ahead. "We are immersed in an unending process, not in a quest for a final destination. The deepest problems of equilibrium are not physical but psychological or moral. The shape of the future will depend ultimately on convictions which far transcend the physical balance of power." This underlies what Kissinger wrote twenty years ago, that a statesman is an educator; his duty is to "bridge the gap between a people's experience and his vision, between a nation's tradition and its future." We can ask if Kissinger has performed this task as assiduously as he might have. Secret diplomacy is all well and good, but if Kissinger is to have any lasting effect on American foreign policy, or at least any lasting beneficial effect, he must begin the task of educating not only the nation's President, but also the lasting enduring rulers in a democracy—the people at large, as well as the Congress and the press—so that Americans will begin to come to terms soberly, and, let us hope, successfully, with the responsibilities of doing what we can to see that liberty shall not perish where it exists on this earth.

William Kristol

Book Review

The Case Against Pornography

by David Holbrook
Library $8.95

ONE OF THE FIRST effects of reading David Holbrook's *The Case Against Pornography* is to compel the realization that there are those who make a case *for* pornography, who regard it as or imply that it is a positive good. In his *Life Against Death*, Norman O. Brown suggests that the role of art is to return us to the sources of pleasure prohibited by "capitulation to the reality-principle which we call education or maturity—in other words, to regain the lost laughter of infancy." This return to infancy aims at releasing men from the constrictions of "civilized" life. Therefore, the artist must primarily be a subverter of civilization. Of course, one must avoid the danger of ascribing to Mr. Brown views that he does not hold. Accepting his perspective, however, one can hardly object to pornography because it is a return to infantile sexuality. And if breaking out of the intellectual and moral horizons necessarily imposed by a culture or political community is the path to a fuller, more human existence, then pornography might be one means of achieving this superior lifestyle.

This point of view has had an undeniable impact on many contemporary American intellectuals. During the past decade we have witnessed the consecration of "experience" as the ultimate human value. Education has become a series of "educational experiences." The art of the sixties included a deluge of "happenings." And recent drama has brought us theater, "living" and "liquid." It is clear that the case for pornography now has a place in the new culture. Following the recent Supreme Court pornography decision, the death knell, as usual, was sounded for the First Amendment. But more disturbing were the articles in which it was asked: "What's so bad about the stuff anyway?" The reasoning behind this view is simple: Sexual fantasies are an intense, personal human experience. Therefore, their indulgence and display

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should be permitted and even encouraged.

The aim of Holbrook's anthology, of course, is to counter this view. The central point in nearly every one of the articles, whether dealing with "hard-core" pornography, sex education, sex clinics, or the novels of William Burroughs, is that much of the contemporary attitude toward sex is dehumanizing and degrading. By separating sexuality from the whole complex of other human activities, relationships, and emotions, it reduces human beings to objects. Sexual fantasies might be personal, but they are not unique. In other words, the mere portrayal of the sex act does not convey the importance of individual qualities of particular persons in mature human relationships. It is essentially a form of voyeurism.

Clearly, this is a very broad principle. It leads many of these essayists to classify as pornographic a great deal more than just Times Square's typical offering. It also extends to the area of distinguishing pornography from "erotic art." No one would deny that pleasure is an essential part of an artistic experience. But art is not merely "having one's sensorium challenged or stretched," as Susan Sontag suggests. Rather the pleasure and pain produced by art both draws on and molds what the audience for that art holds to be good and evil, noble and base. Holbrook's book reminds us that ultimately, there is no treatment of human sexuality—whether pornographic, literary, or educational—that is morally neutral. All of them deal, if only by implication or silence, with the differences or absence of differences between mere sex and human love.

Interestingly enough, most of the contributors to *The Case Against Pornography* are the intellectual cousins of the defenders of pornography. Many of the authors, particularly the authors of the longer articles, are psychotherapists and psychiatrists. Their articles do contain occasional references to Plato, for example, and even a few to traditional Judeo-Christian ethics. But the names constantly repeated are those of other psychologists, especially Freud. This approach has its merits, of course. Men such as Benjamin Spock and Rollo May are respected and trusted by many. The selection of articles also gives the book a contemporary cast, and it is important that the case against pornography can be made on the same intellectual grounds as the case favoring it.

Unfortunately, the predominance of this one point of view leads to an undeniable weakness in the book. The major disadvantage of the psychological or literary approach to pornography is that both tend to gloss over politics. Although Holbrook does include articles by Walter Berns and Irving Kristol, these are the only essays that come to grips with the political aspects of the pornography debate. And yet pornography is eminently a political problem. The psychologist's or philosopher's question of what constitutes a good or fulfilling life is a preliminary problem. The political step from what is wrong with pornography to what are we going to do about it involves a myriad of new and complex considerations.

Not the least of these considerations is whether there are sufficient reasons for risking the dangers inherent in any type of censorship, no matter how moderate or judicious, simply because we find the sale and use of pornography distasteful. Or to put the question in more immediate terms: What would compel a Supreme Court, if not "liberal," at least libertarian enough to hand down the recent abortion decision, to uphold the right of local communities to censor what they regard as harmful to public morals?

One argument, infrequently made and seldom taken seriously, is that pornography leads to crime. Holbrook's book includes a brief article by Ernest van den Haag, in which he points to the possibility that pornography (which, he argues, nearly always leads to sadistic pornography) might foment the disposition in some to commit violent sex-crimes. There is no way to prove or disprove this proposition scientifically. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court regards it as a "reasonable" assumption that a connection between pornography and "antisocial" behavior might exist. An argument for this position can certainly be made. Anyone familiar with the successful rock performer Alice Cooper can testify that the line separating complete sexual abandon and the glorification of violence and sadism is a thin one indeed. Because social mores regarding sex restrain normal as well as abnormal behavior, they provide a guide for or barrier to everyone's actions. This is not true of prohibitions against theft or violence. Barring situations of abject poverty or psychological disturbance, people tend to regard these as provisions to protect them from "the other guy." It is because of this difference in sexual mores that liberation from them could well lead to an atmosphere of license that might foster violence. In any case, pornography is a more probable cause of crime than the Saturday morning television cartoons that so worry many ritualistic liberals.

That pornography and crime might be connected is worthy of consideration because the concern for the physical safety of citizens is shared by everyone, regardless of his political convictions. Yet, at least as important as this possibility, is the belief that pornography represents a threat to political liberty itself. This conclusion is based on the recognition that the duties of citizenship frequently demand that we sacrifice our personal desires for the sake of some higher, public good. This is especially true of democratic citizenship, which requires attention to political matters, patience with the democratic process, and compliance with the outcome of that process. Even in a large, commercial republic self-interest is a virtue only in the market place. When it comes to politics, an appeal to some higher motive is necessary. To the degree that pornography undermines this spirit of self-sacrifice, or contributes to the decay of other institutions that encourage self-restraint, it damages what Lincoln called the "capability of a people to govern themselves."

Though this argument is hardly in vogue today, it is a familiar one in American history. In an extraordinary letter to his wife Abigail during the Revolutionary War, John Adams expressed the hope that General Howe would capture Philadelphia. He believed that the ensuing hardship "would cure Americans of their vicious and luxurious and effeminate appetites; Passions and Habits, a more dangerous Army to American liberty than Mr. Howe's." Adam's puritanism would be anomalous, to

"Not since Mencken, I think, has journalism of this quality and pungency appeared very often."

— Arthur Krock



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say the least, in our time, and was even regarded as anachronistic in his own. It does, however, show how indispensible "republican virtue" was once thought to be for maintaining political freedom. And this belief, that self-government rests on something as unscientific as the good character of its citizens, is a recurrent theme in the writings and speeches of our greatest statesmen.

It is intriguing that despite our pessimism about many things relating to the future, most of us are sanguine about the future of liberal democracy. The United States is no longer "the American experiment" to us. Implicit in many of our actions and attitudes is the view that democratic government is the rule and that exceptions to that rule are bound eventually to fail. We tend to assume that with any increase in freedom of expression, the "free market place of ideas" will guarantee that regardless of what is being expressed, a better or healthier society will be the result. *The Case Against Pornography* gives us reason to doubt these assumptions. It offers ample evidence of how permissiveness can, among other things, corrupt the arts or destroy a neighborhood. Since the Progressive era, Americans have become increasingly aware of the fact that the pursuit of private economic interests does not necessarily enhance the public welfare. Perhaps it is time to reexamine an older view of democracy that recognized that the tension between the public and the private exists in all areas of political life.

Finally, one can argue that pornography should be censored not because it causes corruption, but because it is corruption. That pornography is base and dehumanizing is an assumption well justified by all of the contributors to Holbrook's book. The political conclusion that can be drawn from their work is that all decent societies must draw the line somewhere when it comes to freedom of activity. As Chief Justice Burger pointed out recently: "The state statute books are replete with constitutionally unchallenged laws against prostitution, suicide, voluntary self-mutilation, brutalizing 'bare-fist' prize fights, and duels, although the crime may only directly involve 'consenting adults.'"

It may be true that legal sanction does not necessarily imply public approval; but it does imply, or at least leads to, public acceptance. It is implicit in Burger's statement that certain behavior, though not a direct threat to public safety, is depraved behavior and therefore unacceptable, even in a free society. Such a view is anathema to many of today's liberals. For them the "quality of life" is something that pertains only to the amount of carbon monoxide in the atmosphere. Yet both our political tradition and common sense point to the need to extend the concept beyond the protection of our physical well-being.

Men as different as Thomas Aquinas and Thomas Macaulay warned of the dangers of trying to legislate sanctity. They did not, however, say that there is no such thing as sanctity, or that all human pursuits are equally worthwhile. Liberal democracy is rooted in the belief that it is impossible or unwise for a government to dictate the best way of life for each citizen. But it is not true that to be democrats or even liberals we must deny that it is possible to distinguish human excellence from human degradation.

In a sense, this is the most "political" argument of all. The question of the degree to which pornography contributes to crime is debatable. And even if pornography does not contribute to "republican virtue," the fate of a country with as much individual liberty as ours does not rest on the legalization or prohibition of pornography alone. The real threat is the attitude that "value judgments" with the force of law are unjustifiable in a free society. Perhaps the most important consequence of the current dispute over pornography will be the revelation of how much confidence we have in our values and our judgment.

Robert McTiernan

The Great American Saloon Series

Baltimore's Peabody Book Shop

It has become chic in recent years to disparage American institutions, to give them the Bronx hurrah so to speak, and thus to drain from them their validity and cast them aside. It is our opinion that this chorus of objurgation has accomplished great damage, and we think it is about time to come to the support of the most worthy of our institutions, intoning not what is wrong with these institutions but what is right with them, not what have been their shortcomings but what have been their glories. So it is that in this series we intend to come to the aid of one of the most admirable of American institutions, the Great American Saloon. In the series that follows, ably edited by the erudite and experienced P.D. Tyrrell, we shall publish gently preceptive essays discussing the great American saloons of the past and those that have survived into the very present.

Each essay will suggest the practices and values of truly great American saloons, while elucidating the philosophies of the saloon keepers and mixologists that made their establishments esteemed. If you have suggestions for this series send them to Mr. Tyrrell at P.D.'s Globe Saloon, 929 South Jordan, Bloomington, Indiana, 47401, and as Siegfried Weisberger would say, Happy Days!

On a Saturday night not long ago, The Great Dantini stood before a hushed crowd in the beer stube at Baltimore's Peabody Book Shop. The old magician, half his face hidden by a mat of white beard, had spirited a golf ball from his empty right hand. He dispatched it into thin air, pulled it from his nose and produced it on the end of his tongue.

The thirty or so people applauded politely.

"Would you mind repeating that?" shouted a man, smirking over his drink at a side table.

"What do you want for free?" shot back Dantini. The customers applauded louder. Dantini was dressed in a threadbare red turban, a dusty gray business suit, a crumpled white shirt and sneakers. There was a handkerchief sticking from his coat pocket and his fly was open.

"And now," he continued, "some fancy shuffles. First the accordian shuffle . . . Now the one-handed shuffle . . . And now the Russian shuffle." Cards crawled reluctantly up his arm, sputtered through the air and slid through his fingers. "It took me four years to do that trick," he said, "six months to learn it and three-and-a-half years to find a place to perform it."

"Gee," marvelled a young girl who was sitting near Dantini, one hand on her beer and the other on her boyfriend. "I can barely shuffle with two hands."

"Quiet," commanded Dantini. "Don't mess me up.

"When I was 16 years old, I ran away from Baltimore and went to New York. I arrived at night. The next morning I went out to look for a magic shop. And there it was—at 42nd Street, between 8th and 9th Avenues—a magic shop with tricks all over the place. I went inside and stood there for 3, 4, 5 minutes—about that time—looking at a man. He had his back to me. Finally he turned around and I said: 'Are you the man I've seen in the movies?' He said 'Yes, you've seen me in the movies.' It was the Great Houdini."

*

It was March 1954, and Siegfried Weisberger, owner of the Peabody Book Shop, was calling it quits. "The age of the boob is upon us," he told the *Sun* in a going away interview. "I'm sad. I'm sorry. I wish I didn't have to say it. But mark my words. I predict very dark days for America. . . . Everyone in the cities used to look up to the doctor, the lawyer, the professor. They were idols. Today? They look up to the businessman."

Mr. Weisberger had arrived in the Unit-

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ed States in 1912, an emigrant from Austrian Silesia. Fifteen years passed before he settled in Baltimore to join his brother Hugo's book business. In the interim he had worked as a sea cook, a toy importer, a waiter, and a forest-fire fighter. Mr. Weisberger, the son of a butcher, had six years formal education.

Hugo opened the bookstore on East Centre Street, near the Peabody Conservatory of Music, in 1922. Later in the twenties, the two brothers moved their books to the shop's present location at 913 North Charles Street. Two years after Hugo's death in 1931 in the old garage back of the book shop Siegfried began serving bibliophiles what Roosevelt had proclaimed to be legal. "There were no decent places in town then," Siegfried remembers emphatically. "I wanted to start a place where respectable people could come for a sandwich and a glass of beer." (A local pediatrician, Dr. John Ruhrah, had convinced Siegfried that coffee wouldn't be enough.) "But my main occupation was books."

As a bookseller, Siegfried specialized in music, literature, art, and H.L. Mencken. He served another love, medicine, by opening a medical bookstore on East Monument Street and reading the Journal of the American Medical Association. Among the few books he refused to sell were Greek and Latin ponies, a genre he said was as stunting to youthful development as cigarette smoke. According to the *Sun*, Siegfried ran the shop with financial abandon: "To his farm, after a day in his shop, Siegfried repairs to rest and work on the earth. Whether he made a profit that day doesn't matter too much—a newsboy who asked the price of an encyclopedia was told it was $5, a fib that cost the bookseller about $20—but the main thing is that people read."

"But I walked out of that shop a rich man," he asserts today. walked out with memories no money could buy. I left with a polish, if I might say so, that no university could provide." Among the Baltimoreans Siegfried called his friends were Gerald W. Johnson, the writer, Dr. Henry Sigerist, the medical historian, and H.L. Mencken, the newspaperman. "I was in New York during the Depression when I saw Mencken's *In Defense of Women* sitting on a drug store book rack," he recalled. "When I got home I wrote to him saying that his book had no business being among that trash. He wrote back by return mail, thanking me and asking if I would come to see him. . . ." It was Siegfried, bookman and friend, whom Mencken asked to appraise his books before he turned them over to the Enoch Pratt Free Library.

*

Siegfried Weisberger, a six-footer who wore thick glasses, tweedy clothes, a ferocious mustache, and a droopy bow tie, had amassed an exacting set of preferences by the time of his retirement. He preferred, among other things the Bill of Rights, the Magna Carta, toy trains, Mark Twain, high-speed cathartics, H.L. Mencken, manual labor in moderate doses, and drugstores that sold banana splits. He disliked, among other things, members of the city vice squad who worked with their hats on inside his premises.

In the fall of 1952, a year and a half before Siegfried's decision to retire, police had arrested a 20-year-old Yale student at the Peabody for drinking as a minor. The student, who was sports editor of the *Yale Daily News*, was in town to cover a Yale-Navy football game. Yale lost that day, 31-0, but that was only the beginning of a miserable weekend for the thirsty reporter. By the time Sgt. William Klump of the city vice squad and an unnamed police magistrate had finished their work, the student was poorer by $35.40 and court costs. Siegfried was so enraged—as he tells it now—that he decided to say the hell with everything.

Judging the student well over 21, Siegfried said he had not bothered to ask him for proof of age. "He came in, sat down and ordered a beer," Siegfried remembered. "When the police came in they found out he was 20. That made me a criminal. I payed $450 in fines (one of many fines during his proprietorship). So I said to hell with it. If that's the way they want to do things, I'll have no part in it." Disgusted with both the single-mindedness of the police and the overall state of the Republic, Siegfried looked around for someone to take over the shop as a going book business. He found no one, so he sold his books—there were 100,000—and retired to his farm. "It was as irrevocable as Sherwood Anderson walking out of the paint factory." Today he reads, listens to music, writes, and deplores the condition of contemporary publishing. He said he has not been to the bookshop since he left it in 1954. "I have nothing to do with it any more," he said. "Nothing. It is a hash house."

The ex-sports editor remembers the raid without bitterness, though at the time, he said "I was so P.O.'ed that I couldn't believe it. After the game, all my friends had gone down to the Block (the place in Baltimore for drinking, gaming, and whoring), but I figured I'd play it safe, so I went to the Peabody instead. I browsed through the books awhile, then went into the beer stube and ordered. There was a violinist playing and a candle was burning in the corner." The next thing he knew, the police were sealing his beer bottle and seizing it as evidence. "The cops were real nice to me," he said. "They said all they wanted was to get Weisberger."

"I went through the whole bit. At the station they took off my shoe laces and belt. . . . I don't know whether you've ever been in a Baltimore jail cell, but it was just unbelievable. It was really filthy. I sort of stood in the middle, afraid to touch anything."

But it all blew over. Yale understood and so, after a while, did his parents. The student continued with journalism after leaving Yale and has become something of a star on NBC news. Success hasn't spoiled him though. He still uses the same by-line: Richard Valeriani.

*

Rose Boyajin Pettus had $8 to her name when Siegfried was scouting around for a successor in January 1954. "I'd just hit this town then," she said. But within four years, she and her husband were calling the Peabody theirs. "It only served beer and wine," she said, "but we saw the potential right away. We tripled or quadrupled—is that the word?—the business here in five or six years. . . . Some people are academic in the way they think. I'm more mercantile."

A lot has changed since Siegfried's day. The books now are a sideline, although Charlie Lancaster, who watches over them for Rose, says he gets a few "good pieces" once in a while. In the section marked "novels and stories," the browser will find *An Introduction to General Chemistry* (second edition) by Foster and Alyea; *World Enough and Time Enough*, by Robert Penn Warren; and Edmund Burke, *On Conciliation with America*. To lay your hands on Macfadden's *Encyclopedia of Physical Culture*, Volume IV, go to the opposite end of the room and look in the shelves marked "drama."

Nearby are shelved John Hersey, *The War Lover*; and *The Universal Standard Encyclopedia*, Volume II (GILB-HANS). Also for sale, among what Rose estimates are 6,000 volumes, are *Merchant Vessels of the United States* (1972); *The Crisis of the Old Order*, by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.; and *Servicing Receivers by Means of Resistance Measurement*, by Rider. "A lot of this is junk, if you want to know the truth," Rose told a visitor.

Customers are young and often shaggy. Some are drawn by Dantini's nightly performances or by the piano playing of Eddie Mitnick, who accompanied the silent films in Baltimore. (He plays when Rose shows old movies in the beer stube.) Charlie Lancaster, a former seaman and occasional poet, helps Rose take care of her real estate and meets with a group in the upstairs bar for wine and cheese. Rose says that the

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regular customers can get on her nerves: "They're always complaining it's too hot, too cold, too this too that. But in the trade journals—I read a lot of trade journals—they say that's a good sign. If someone starts complaining I usually tell him 'I didn't call up and send for you.'"

The Peabody sells nearly everything these days. In addition to beer (customers tend to nurse beer, Rose says), cocktails, hot drinks, sandwiches, steaks, knockwurst, and pizza, you can buy a Peabody Book Shop ashtray (50 cents); a PBS ballpoint pen (75 cents); a PBS 12-oz. beer mug ($2.50); second-hand, PBS greeting cards (5 cents each); or a PBS T-shirt ($1.50).

But little, apparently, has changed in the old beer stube itself. A picture of Mencken still hangs over the piano. On the mantle piece, above a cavernous fireplace, sit busts of Shakespeare and Mendelssohn. Patrons still lay their elbows on the old wooden tables, riddled with the initials of unnumbered students. Sketches, beer steins, plates, trophies, musical instruments, antlered heads, and photographs line the walls. Above one table hangs a group photograph of the 33rd annual meeting of the American Roentgen Ray Society, taken at the Book-Cadillac Hotel, in Detroit, in September, 1932.

James Grant

Book Review

The Conservative Alternative

edited by David Brudnoy
Winston $3.95

FOR MOST OF THE past three decades, American conservatism has been, in Clinton Rossiter's words, a "thankless persuasion." Cut off from decisive political power, isolated from influence in the universities and the media, accused of not belonging to the nation's supposedly liberal "mainstream," denounced for extremism and "authoritarian" personalities, the Right has generally lacked intellectual prestige and broad public confidence. The rhetoric of conservatism has long reflected its forlorn, minority status. In the 1940s and 1950s many conservatives sought solace in Albert Jay Nock's concept of the Remnant: a scattering of reflective and civilized individuals surrounded by mass men. In the very first issue of *National Review* in 1955, William F. Buckley admitted that his magazine was "out of place": "It stands athwart History, yelling Stop. . . ." These were years in which Buckley challenged the wisdom of universal suffrage, when conservatives praised Ortega y Gasset's *The Revolt of the Masses* and helped to popularize de Tocqueville's idea of "the tyranny of the majority." The spirit of H.L. Mencken, that scornful critic of the "booboisie," noticeably affected the early issues of *National Review*. Conservatives were intellectual untouchables, and they knew it.

In the early 1960s, with the advent of Barry Goldwater and his appeal to the "forgotten Americans," conservatism's minority consciousness started to fade. Still, its rhetoric remained that of an embattled losing side: "Twenty-seven million Americans can't be wrong," proclaimed bumper stickers after Goldwater's defeat in 1964. Defiant language, yes, but not the language of victory.

In the past five years, however, American conservatism has undergone a fundamental and exhilarating transformation. No longer political pariahs, conservatives have finally found themselves in a position to compete genuinely for national leadership. Emerging from the wilderness, they have suddenly tasted victories: James Buckley's election to the Senate, new and congenial appointments to the Supreme Court, and the emphatic repudiation of McGovernism in 1972, to name a few. Thanks to vigorous criticism of the media's objectivity and balance, conservative commentators have begun to appear more frequently on television and even on the Op-Ed page of the *New York Times*. Paralleling this enormous change in status has been an intriguing shift in rhetoric. Instead of an aristocratic revolt against the masses, there has appeared a frankly "populist" conservatism, extolling Middle America and berating a decadent liberal elite. America is not "sick," conservatives argue; liberalism is. *We* are the "mainstream" now. "I am the voice of the new politics," Senator-elect Buckley announced in November 1970 as the votes poured in. Many conservatives have now unabashedly embraced the once seemingly forbidden and unreachable "silent majority."

Nevertheless, old attitudes and apprehensions die hard. Despite the tonic of recent successes, conservatism in 1973 is not yet securely entrenched as the uncontested voice of the people. Some of the current uncertainty is reflected in David Brudnoy's new anthology, *The Conservative Alternative*. As a college professor, film critic, and frequent contributor to right-wing journals, Brudnoy has helped to effect the conservative renaissance of recent years. But in his introduction he does not allow himself the luxury of self-satisfaction or unguarded optimism. He contrasts, for instance, the new *political* power of conservatives with their continuing *intellectual* weakness: conservative scholars, he says, are "generally ignored by the intellectual community," and the conservative movement is still "far more often critical than programmatic." He even strikes an old Nockian note when he observes that his mentor Frank Meyer, who should have served on a university faculty, was instead "known to the Remnant, but to few others." And Brudnoy does not shrink from asking a tough, unsettling question about his own anthology: " . . . is the very existence of this book simply an expression of kindly tokenism on the part of its publisher, a sop to the funny little gaggle of conservatives who quack a lot and fancy themselves a force with which other Americans must contend?"

Brudnoy leaves the answer to this question to his readers. But he is wise to raise the question, not because his book is irrelevant (it is not), nor because conservatives are really a "gaggle" of unimportant people (they are not), but because the "prospects" (his word) for conservatism remain so indeterminate. For all its achievements, the American Right has as yet only earned the *chance* to govern. It is still "in the middle of the journey," and who, after the scandals of 1973, would dare to read the crystal ball?

And yet, cautious as Brudnoy rightly is, there *is* something to celebrate. Whatever the (mis)fortunes of conservatism may eventually be, the indisputable fact is that as an intellectual movement conservatism has arrived. One sign of its maturity is the appearance in recent years of several anthologies of conservative writings, including, now, Brudnoy's contribution—an excellent collection of twenty-nine provocative essays, all published since 1970. Any movement that can produce twenty-nine articles of such high quality in three years cannot be moribund.

These essays, drawn principally from *National Review*, *Modern Age*, and *New Guard*, exemplify the work of a substantial segment of the conservative Establishment. Such familiar luminaries as William F. Buckley, Russell Kirk, Frank Meyer, Stephen Tonsor, and Ernest van den Haag are all represented, as are such younger writers as R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr., George Will, and Brudnoy himself. Libertarians will applaud Henry Hazlitt's concise defense of capitalism and Thomas Szasz's iconoclastic essay, "The Ethics of Addiction." Brudnoy is especially to be commended for including outstanding articles by Irving Kristol, editor of the *Public Interest*, and Professor James Q. Wilson of Harvard—two of the principal spokesmen for what this reviewer likes to call "right-wing liberalism" and what Brudnoy designates "neo-conservatism." Whatever the label we choose, Brudnoy has properly recognized one of the encouraging elements in the intellectual realignments of the seventies.

Three kinds of essays comprise this anthology. First, there are the obligatory selections which strive to define the nature of conservatism. Six well-chosen pieces by Buckley, Kirk, Meyer, Peter Witonski, M. Stanton Evans, and Tibor Szamuely introduce the reader to the fascinating complexities of this perennial problem. But the anthology does not stop here. Brudnoy goes on to include several articles which probe the profoundly spiritual and intellectual sources of America's discontents. Notable

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are Jeffrey Hart's "Secession of the Intellectuals," James Burnham's "Notes on Authority, Morality, Power," and Irving Kristol's "A Foolish American Ism—Utopianism": three of the most incisive studies of our malaise written anywhere in this decade.

Finally, Brudnoy has gathered a generally distinguished set of articles which examine specific contemporary public issues from an intelligent right-wing perspective. Ralph Waldo Emerson (an unlikely person to quote here) once remarked that a scholar is "man thinking." Brudnoy has given us not just a sample of Conservative Thought but several fine illustrations of conservatives *thinking*, of *applied* conservatism, of *practical* analysis. Those who think of conservatives as either quaint romantic reactionaries or ignorant ranters should read such perceptive, fact-laden articles as James Q. Wilson's study of the federal regulatory agencies, George Will's "The Conservative Critique of the Welfare State," or Anthony Harrigan's somber "America's Deteriorating Defense Posture." Those who think in abstractions about prison reform should read Frederick Wiggins' gripping account, "The Truth About Attica By An Inmate." Those who still believe that media bias is a right-wing hobgoblin should consult Edith Efron's pungent investigation of television news coverage. Those who contend that conservatives are indifferent to the environment should scrutinize Frank and John Meyer's demonstration of the ways in which the free market mechanism can be used to curb pollution. All these articles are included in Brudnoy's book. And there are more.

In evaluating an anthology one is always tempted to quarrel with a few of the editor's judgments. I forbear. The really important question is: does Brudnoy's anthology adequately encompass contemporary conservative perspectives? The answer must be yes; it is difficult to think of a major conservative viewpoint or concern that is not expressed in these pages. And these articles do not routinely recite the standard complaints; rather, they persuasively argue the *legitimacy* of the conservative case. Those who read this book may not become conservative, but they will surely learn that a responsible conservative alternative exists.

Who, then, should read this anthology? Conservatives, to be sure, for whom the book will be a convenient collection of significant essays. But far more importantly, Brudnoy's work should be read in college and high school courses in politics and related fields. That should be its true market: uncommitted, indifferent, and even critical students whose understanding of conservatism is often inadequate or minimal. If only a "gaggle" of the already converted examine this book (and others like it), Brudnoy's anxiety about "tokenism" will prove well-founded.

The Conservative Alternative is another welcome proof of the intellectual sophistication of the Right. It is always a pleasure to find essays and books that forcefully restate conservative convictions and beckon us, in Robert Frost's words, "to the truths we keep coming back and back to." Perhaps, with articulate leadership like that represented here, conservatism will successfully transform itself from an isolated Remnant into the confident voice of a political majority. But let us not congratulate ourselves too soon. Unless our message is conveyed outward, particularly to the young, the vaunted "silent majority" may ultimately melt away. And then *The Conservative Alternative*, and much else, would become merely monuments—imposing but lifeless—to a world that might have been.

George Nash

Slaughter on the Waterbed

MAGNUM FORCE HAS broken new ground in the degeneration of the filmic process. It is the first black exploitation film made for television with a white hero, released at theatres.

All of these superficially irreconcilable elements have been blended together in the sequel to *Dirty Harry* now packing them in from coast to coast. As everyone knows, Clint Eastwood, the famous character actor, plays Harry Calahan, a fantastically tough cop, in both movies.

In the first film, *Dirty Harry*, Eastwood was so disgusted by the pansified way the Supreme Court compelled policemen to behave that he quit the force. In some of the most gripping moments of movie lore, he struggled by night with a lunatic killer and finally killed him in an authentically exciting finish.

Somehow all of the excitement of the first film has vanished from the second. There is no doubt whatever that Harry Calahan will emerge relatively unscathed and victorious. He has become a legendary tough figure without any depth whatsoever. He has moved from the tormented *persona* of *Dirty Harry* to the robot-like figure of Shaft or Superfly or Slaughter.

From the fantastically popular black exploitation films, the makers of *Magnum Force* have taken a character which, by itself, blows the whole picture out of the water.

The slender web of story which supports various shots of Clint Eastwood does have a fascinating social content, although it seems incongruous in a film which is obviously begging the viewer not to think about it at all.

A group of rookie policemen, all veterans of the Special Forces in Nam has joined the San Francisco Police Department. In an unexplained way, Dirty Harry Calahan has rejoined that same force. All four of the rookies are deadly shots with the .357 magnum pistol (get it, "Magnum Force"?) and all hang around together and look like a cross between Jeb Magruder and Andy Warhol.

(But Harry Calahan does not mind if they look gay: "Hell, I wouldn't care if the whole force was queer if they could shoot like those boys," he quips to his patrol car partner, a black.)

Some group of people have been roaming San Francisco and Marin killing gangsters without benefit of trial. They have formed themselves into a Bay Area equivalent of the Brazilian "Death Squads." We viewers know that the killers are policemen, and with the title and the crazed look of the young rookies, well, it does not take long to come up with the shocking truth.

Eventually, Dirty Harry kills the killers, and their leader, the satanically clever Hal Holbrook, who pretends to loathe killing while secretly glorying in it and recruiting the killers. But before Dirty Harry has done his job, the killers leave behind a frightening trail of mayhem.

The first victims are a gangster and his two bodyguards. All well and good. But also killed is the gangster's lawyer, which might puzzle some. The next victims however really hit the social revolution jackpot.

A group of young men and women are loitering by a backyard pool in Marin. The men are handsome, the women beautiful. Some of the people are swimming. Some of the swimming people are bare-breasted. No further description of the group is given.

Stealthily, a member of the "magnum force" creeps up to the bushes by the pool. He first throws a bomb into the pool, then machine guns the people around the pool. No further explanation of the rationale for the crime is given.

The next victim is a more understandable target. He is a black pimp who has just ripped off a rebellious member of his company by forcing Drano down her throat.

But after that, the killers shoot a mobster who has been hiding out in an apartment along with his nude boy and girl companions. All have been frolicking on a huge round waterbed when the killer, dressed in leather from toe to neck, wearing visors, kicks in the door and blows them

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through the window to the ground twenty floors below.

To add a delightful touch for the leather fetishists and sado-masochists in the crowd, the nude boy and girl cling together, childlike, and plead for mercy as the remorseless killer blasts them apart.

The motive for all of these murders cannot be gangsterism. Not all of the victims are gangsters. Nor can it be an eye for an eye. Not all of the victims are themselves killers. At one point the leader of the killers explains that the victims are people who "are threats to society."

So here is the equation: well-to-do plus sexually active equals threats to society. The people around the swimming pool and the pathetically pleading boy and girl on the waterbed are obviously being rubbed out for the sin of their fleshly appetites and their satisfaction.

Recently Herman Kahn and other social scientists have been saying that the lower-middle classes are in revolt over the ease of life and sexual libertinage of the upper-middle classes. The theory is simply that the hardhats are enraged that the upper-middle classes are getting away with something that the hardhats feel is forbidden or at least shameful. In *Magnum Force*, the epitome of hardhattism, the policeman is striking back with a vengeance.

For the sin of enjoying what should be forbidden, for bringing into the open what should be clandestine, the death penalty has been revived.

And lest all the swingers draw any comfort from Dirty Harry Calahan's killing all the leather covered executioners, remember their leader's words . . . "Heh, heh . . . There's plenty more where they came from."

Roundheads and Cavaliers, choose your weapons.

After this rich diet of social futurism though, the movie serves up only the thinnest of soups. It is totally predictable from start to finish. It involves no character development whatsoever, except for the spurious Jekyll-Hyde personality changes when a meek person is revealed to be a psychopathic killer. There is no acting. Facial expressions are always fixed in a smile or a frown. Women are treated with contempt as sex hungry subhumans. Camera angles and framing are reminiscent of television advertisements for tires.

All of these are the flaws of movies made for television. *Magnum Force* has them all, and for long periods of watching *Magnum Force*, the viewer will find himself wondering when the Alka-Seltzer commercials are coming on.

There is a constant struggle going on over whether movies will take their dominant inspiration from good theatre or bad television. With *Magnum Force*, score a big one for Captain Video, and for Herman Kahn. □

Book Review

The Future While It Happened

by Samuel Lubell
Norton $5.95

Sam Lubell is a small, frog-like man with thick glasses and a croaking voice. One sees very little of him on television, even when, as occasionally happens, a network commissions him to do a poll. Nevertheless, he has a truer reporter's instinct than any of the sleek, bland, dinner-hour pundits who monopolize the screen—even if he does tend to oversimplify things at times.

According to Lubell, greedy self-interest lies at the heart of most people's voting motivation. Personally, I suspect that Lubell's simplistic, almost naive brand of cynicism fails to do justice to a myriad of far more objectionable factors than self-interest—hatred, fear, envy, rage, stupidity, and, most dangerous of all, misguided altruism, to name only a few. But self-interest, while not the only, is certainly the most powerful of these factors.

Let it pass, for Lubell considers himself neither a moralist nor a reporter. He glories in the title of opinion analyst and, ever since his remarkably accurate forecast of voting trends in the 1952 presidential election, he has spent most of his time taking America's pulse. Actually, reading America's mind would probably be a better way of describing it. What he has found during some of his recent brain probes makes for interesting reading.

By concentrating on carefully selected community samplings, and by interviewing in depth instead of relying on brief questionnaires with confining, prefabricated answers, Lubell manages to soak up not only the immediate, direct political trends, but also the fine strains of economic interest, regional background, prejudice, and perspective that cause a given person or group to vote a particular way in an individual election.

Harris, Gallup, and the race of one-dimensional statisticians they have spawned could learn a lot from Sam Lubell, but it is the politicians rather than the pollsters who have the most to gain from studying his *raw* findings. I italicize "raw" because once Lubell starts injecting his own prejudices as an old-line liberal, their value begins to drop sharply and you must edit as you read.

It is what Sam Lubell hears and notes during his interviews—the gripes, hopes, fears, and resentments of individual citizens (and their evolution over the past two decades) that makes his book unique.

Lubell's premise that, again and again, self-interest is decisive hardly qualifies as a novel idea, but it is good to see a long-neglected contributor to these pages, Dr. George Washington Plunkett, vindicated. It was he, after all, who long ago entitled his study of altruism in American politics, *What's in It for Me?*

Blue-collar workers, college students, minority group members, or pensioners—that is the one question they all want answered. Once they decide on the answer (sometimes correctly, sometimes not), they almost invariably vote accordingly.

In the Roosevelt coalition, born as it was of the Great Depression, this meant that blacks, blue collars, left-wing intellectuals, and many hard-hit white collars all looked to government to bail them out of a sticky financial fix.

With prosperity (and the more gradual passing of the old Depression trauma that stayed with many voters long after the Depression itself was past) many members of this coalition of dependency began to perceive that big government had given them just about everything they needed from it. From here on out, as they saw it, most new domestic programs would deal not with the mass of working Americans, but with groups like welfare mothers and unemployed slum dwellers (many of them conveniently color-coded). In individual cases where they still felt a need, such as medicare, they continued to support further government involvement, but these became the exceptions.

Coupled with emotional irritants like rioting, ever-higher taxes, and forced busing, and added to the numerous failures of the New Frontier and the Great Society at home and abroad, this caused a major realignment. Richard Nixon and George Wallace between them proved that most of the nation was fed up with traditional Democratic liberalism in 1968. Then, in 1972, with the economy still healthy enough so that the mass of gainfully employed Americans felt financially secure, they resoundingly rejected old liberalism and new populism together, in the rather sorry form of George McGovern.

Where will it go from here? Watergate, energy problems, and the economic hitches attending the latter could drive many of the members of the new coalition back into the arms of a charismatic demagogue with a liberal program artfully embellished with a few Wallace-style trimmings. On the other hand, if the economy does not plunge, and the Republican Party doesn't panic or commit suicide, my guess is that, come 1976, we will see a moderately conservative Republican elected to the White House at the same time that both major parties continue to lose prestige with the voters and large segments of the electorate continue to cast about for new faces, new labels, and more permanent political home.

After all, one thing is always true of coalitions: They are never permanent.

Aram Bakshian, Jr.

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The Bootblack Stand

by George Washington Plunkitt

Dr. George Washington Plunkitt, our prize-winning political analyst, is celebrating the publication of his new book, which is now available at avant-garde *bookstores throughout New Jersey. Dr. Plunkitt's book is about the importance of altruism in politics and it is titled* What's in It for Me? *Although Dr. Plunkitt expects to earn ten million dollars from sales of his new book, he has agreed to continue to advise public figures through this column. Address all correspondence to The Bootblack Stand, c/o The Establishment, R.R. 11, Box 360, Bloomington, Indiana 47401, Continental U.S.A.*

Dear Dr. Plunkitt:

I am faced with an indelicate situation. While listening to the daily six-hour wrap-up of the news on National Public Radio I found the solution to the energy crisis when one of the learned commentators interviewed a German emigrant now residing in Teaneck, New Jersey. Dr. Adolph Doltheimer, a hitherto obscure scientist and part-time dishwasher, received his early training at the Munich Institute of Popular Mechanics. Sadly, his first scholarly publication, "The Static Dynamism of the Bovine Feces," received such furious ridicule in the professional journals that he was literally driven from his post as research gardener at the University of Bavaria and . . . well, he was incarcerated in a local asylum for certain early morning experiments he insisted on engaging in. During his incarceration he became politically active in the new politics of the time, and his career was vindicated in the middle thirties when he was raised to a high research position in the German government. After the war he turned up in Teaneck and continued his researches, the pursuit of which earned him the somewhat curious reputation he now holds in that town.

At any rate on National Public Radio he recently disclosed his breathtaking discovery that there are calculable amounts of useful energy in decaying human feces. What is more he has developed techniques to utilize this energy, and—according to his extrapolations—if scientists lay a field of human feces across an area the size of Oklahoma enough energy can be extracted to supply all the needs of New York for the next twenty-four months. My problem is how do we break the news to Oklahomans? And do you think Dr. Doltheimer's unfortunate political background will influence the success of our program?

William E. Simon
Federal Energy Office

Dear Mr. Simon:

After looking over some of your other proposals, rationing, mandatory speed limits of 55 miles per hour, federally policed living rooms, and so forth, I am surprised that you would view Dr. Doltheimer's political past as controversial. As to your other problem, I suggest you leave the people of Oklahoma alone, and instead conduct your program in and around New York City. I am sure you could spread your revolutionary new energy source all over the city and the average New Yorker would not even notice its presence. In fact the last time I was there, it appeared someone had beaten you to it.

—GWP

Dear Dr. Plunkitt:

My name is Sky and I live on nothing but seeds, seeds and small things. I am the child of Neptune and Joan Baez, and I love the surf, the earth, and budding things. In fact I love Bud. He is my roommate, and we take showers together. But we never use soap. It has hexachlorophene and it will turn your mind into a mass of saponaceous goo and the fishes will not be able to swim in it. We use sand.

Peace and freedom,
Sky

Dear Mr. Sky:

I am always getting letters like this from ex-Capitol Hill staffers. Generally they are from Senator Kennedy's staff, and I am getting pretty tired of them. If you people are so dratted happy why do you always have to tell people like me about it? If personal happiness is your personal problem why not keep it personal? And stop sending me plastic flowers.

—GWP

Book Review

Seeds of Extinction

Jeffersonian Philanthrophy and the American Indian
by Bernard W. Sheehan
University of North Carolina $11.95

FEW SUBJECTS HAVE received so much attention from historians as that of the gradual but seemingly inevitable retreat of the "savage" before the march of American "civilization." Unfortunately most of this interest has tended to focus on the battlefield narrative. And while such narratives have contributed to a popular awareness of such outrages as the massacres at Sand Creek and Wounded Knee, they have contributed little to an increased understanding of the historic complexities involved in Indian-white relations. There have been exceptions to this of course. Roy Harvey Pearce's study of the Indian as idea and symbol, Robert F. Berkhofer's study of Protestant missionary efforts, and Francis Paul Prucha's survey of federal Indian policy (all three covering the same period as the book under review, late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries) have been especially valuable. But these have been the exception rather than the rule. For the most part the reader is served up cliché-ridden, shabbily researched accounts of the slow and torturous destruction of the native American, sometimes portrayed as noble, sometimes as ignoble, but rarely as he really was.

Professor Sheehan's work is concerned not so much with the nature of the Indian as with the white perceptions of his nature and how these perceptions were to be translated into an Indian policy. Where previous studies have attempted to probe the subtleties of white perceptions of the Indian, and where others have treated the evolution of an Indian policy, until now no one has attempted to explain in any depth the relationship between the two. Thus, in the words of the author, the uniqueness of this study "lies in its juxtaposition of thought and event and in its effort to describe the manner in which the two depend on and are influenced by each other. It is, consequently, an attempt to infuse into the study of Indian-white relations, and into the history of disparate cultures, a deeper perception of the importance of thought and attitude in the making of historical event." The result of Sheehan's labors is a first-class piece of historical scholarship. If his purpose is somewhat awesome, so is his accomplishment.

While it is impossible to do justice to the line of argument in this important work in a review of this size, it is possible to sketch the broad outlines of Sheehan's interpretation. It is the author's contention that while Americans may have differed significantly on many issues, a consensus of opinion

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pervaded all discussion of the Indian question, a consensus that the author claims was both Jeffersonian and philanthropic. It was Jeffersonian in that Jefferson's life spanned for the most part the period under consideration and his writings helped shape the consensus that was ultimately to determine Indian policy. It was philanthropic in that its thrust was benevolence, albeit a self-serving one. While Indian hating was a powerful force in the young nation, particularly on the frontier, Sheehan demonstrates convincingly that the overwhelming desire of whites was not to exterminate the Indian but to transform him —not to destroy his physical being (although this frequently happened), but to destroy his Indianness. By philanthropists conceptualizing the conflict between Indian and white in terms of savagism versus civilization, with the latter being naturally superior to the former, the seeds of extinction for the Indian were sown.

Sheehan organizes his study around three aspects of the philanthropic design, its "metaphysics," its "program," and finally, its "illusions." Because the author is concerned with explaining the relationship between image and event, idea and policy, he devotes considerable attention to the "metaphysics" of the Indian question.

Two conceptions, that of the noble savage and environmentalism were central to the Jeffersonian framework. While the former prompted the desire to transform the Indian, the latter guaranteed it as a historical inevitability and explained the manner in which it would be accomplished. According to the environmentalist conception, the Indian's present condition (savagery) could be explained in terms of the circumstances of his environment rather than by any inherent inadequacies in his race. Moreover, just as circumstance had produced the savage Indian, so the manipulation of environment might produce the civilized Indian. When one adds to this the enlightenment view of history as civilized progress, the rationale for the total remaking of the Indian was complete.

The philanthropic outlook called for the transformation of the Indian, but as Sheehan points out the "program" through which this transformation was to be accomplished was actually quite feeble, at least when one considers the nature of the task. (When one is pushing history along its natural course of development, the question of program becomes a mute one.) In any case, missionaries and others were only too glad to participate in the grand scheme, and while some might debate whether civilization should precede Christianization, or vice versa, about the ultimate objective there was no dispute. As one philanthropist was to express it: "their whole character, inside and out; language, and morals, must be changed." This called for a heavy dose of education and Christianity, and as Sheehan points out the school and the church were to play a key role in the philanthropic program. And then there was the question of private property. It was inconceivable to the Jeffersonian mind that the Indian could be civilized without owning and farming his own plot of land. Thus, where possible, tribal lands were divided up among individual families for the purpose of breaking down tribal loyalties and for instilling in the Indian a sense of industry. There would, of course, always be some land left over. And this fact enabled the philanthropist to profess benevolence toward the Indian and still participate in the popular pastime of relieving him of his real estate. This was just the sort of benevolence that both the frontiersman and the land speculator could identify with!

A program based on such a simplistic view of cultural change was destined to fail, and so it did. In a final section on "illusions" the author documents the attempt of philanthropists to comprehend the consequences of their efforts. Rather than achieving the transformation hoped for, more often they observed the reality of the Indian's "personal and tribal disintegration." The destruction of savagism was part of the plan, but it had always been assumed that civilization could be neatly slipped into the breach. Not only was the Indian failing to assimilate, he was dying. Unwilling to accept the harsh realities as to the limitations of their design, philanthropists sought explanations. Among those offered were the Indian's propensity for violence, his susceptibility to disease and alcoholism, and finally, his exposure to the vices of a frontier society that not only was scarcely above the Indian on the scale of civilization, but was bent on his destruction as well. It was in this context that philanthropists lent their support to the popular clamor for Indian removal. Once the Indian was removed from the vices of frontier society, it was argued, the civilization process might be renewed under more favorable circumstances. Given the failure of the civilization program, removal served as a convenient solution to an embarrassing situation; it allowed the philanthropist to postpone the day when he would have to confront the validity of his original premises.

Because the scope and purpose of Sheehan's study are so immense and because the issues involved are still with us today, this work will certainly provoke considerable discussion within the historical community. Some, for instance, may question whether the author's emphasis on the consensus of the age is somewhat overstated, or whether the philanthropist had the influence over Indian policy that is implied in this study. But while various aspects of the author's interpretation will no doubt be questioned, this study will stand as a major work in the field for some time to come. For this reason it deserves careful attention by serious students of American history and is required reading for any understanding of one of the more tragic chapters in the nation's history. The full extent of that tragedy is brought home clearly in this study, not because the author has engaged in writing history as moral indictment (he has intentionally avoided such a posture), but because he has thoroughly demonstrated that even the "friends" of the Indian were not really his friends at all. As the author expresses it, "If the frontier adopted the direct method of murdering Indians, humanitarians were only more circumspect in demanding cultural suicide of the tribes." Thus, the ultimate tragedy, "the white man's sympathy was more deadly than his animosity."

But as Sheehan points out, the Indian survived. And he might have added that Indianness, although to a lesser extent, has survived as well. The recent events at Wounded Knee, the revival of traditional ceremonies such as the Sun Dance on several of the reservations, and the self-determination movement in Indian education, all suggest that the issues which confronted the Jeffersonian mind are still very much with us today. And how are these issues to be resolved? Will we at last move beyond what educational historian James Anderson has called the "sub-culture ideology," the idea "that if you are a numerical minority then you are minority in culture." If such is the case, then the Indian will have found a true friend at last, one who not only respects the right of his physical being to exist (something the Jeffersonian philanthropist granted), but one who respects as well his essential humanity and the legitimacy of his traditions.

David Adams

EDITORIAL

(continued from page 4)

Such preposterous fads along with his political, cultural, and religious enthusiasms are almost all dictated by a few hucksters from Manhattan and Cambridge. The intellectualoid is full of fears.

In the final analysis the fundamental elements in every intellectualoid are a) that though he makes a great to-do over "ideas," he does not read seriously, and b) that his mind is incapable of disciplined thought. Indeed he seems always to suffer from what the shrinks call partial personality disorder. He is a neurotic.

The intellectualoid will spend the rest of his life snorting and fuming in the American audience, that immense ocean of sedentary souls who nervously and reproachfully follow the doings of the nation from their armchairs. Occasionally the intellectualoid will rouse himself to participate in a demonstration or to write a semiliterate letter to his local editor, but then he slumps back into his throne and continues to improve his mind, a faculty he cherishes much as a Hollywood star cherishes her pectoralis major.

The intellectualoid is a phenomenon of our mass society, an amusing mutant, hovering somewhere between the library of the intellectual and the sink of the uneducated clod. He has made a resounding botch of politics, the arts—in fact everything he touches becomes a world of Dogberries. From the depths of my well-stocked bomb shelter I salute him and look forward to his increasing influence upon our ever evolving Republic.

R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr.

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The Business of America

by David B. McCall

"Freedom to Advertise"

Lindley H. Clark Jr., the economic news editor of the Wall Street Journal, *initiated this column with four essays discussing the practice of business in America. The series attempted to bring to our readers' attention some of the problems inherent in doing business in America today. We are continuing this series now by publishing essays discussing the American condition from the perspective of individual businessmen. Each essay will be written by a businessman unless otherwise stated.*

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, honored guests: You have every right to wonder what a nice, anonymous boy like me is doing on a program like this. Think of it. Norman Cousins, Senator Barry Goldwater, the Reverend Jesse Jackson, Ralph Nader, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Gloria Steinem, Jacqueline Wexler, and David Who? It's like Seven Snow Whites and the Dwarf.

But I think I know why I am here. When one of my children commented that people must really be excited about listening to me when he heard that this meeting had been moved from Alice Tully Hall to Carnegie Hall, my wife mordantly commented that the Christians vs. the lions had always pulled large and enthusiastic crowds.

My first inkling that I would be placed in an adversary role with Ralph Nader came when I received my schedule of the meeting from the Magazine Publishers Association, containing the dread note, "from 4:15 to 4:25 David McCall and Ralph Nader, with Jacqueline Wexler refereeing a direct exchange between them: 10 minutes." Dear sweet bird of youth, I thought. Then I wondered what I would find to debate with Ralph Nader. After all, I was against the war, active in the civil rights movement, voted for McGovern. Why should I disagree with good old Ralph Nader? I felt like a plump Medici princeling being asked to debate Savonarola.

And then I began to read. I believe I have read almost every word that Mr. Nader and/or his Raiders have spoken about advertising and marketing. They are not going to make it in the copy department, I have concluded. But, much to my surprise, they are not going to make it in the research department either. The occasional factual errors and half-truths are bad enough. But the starting point of their philosophy requires a leap of faith, unsubstantiated by any research or documentation whatsoever, that makes Christian Science look easy. This leap of faith has been called the Myth of the Defenseless Consumer by Stephen Greyser of the Harvard Business School, and I will try to discuss it in its various aspects in the course of this afternoon's talk.

My subject is the freedom to advertise and the price of government restrictions. Freedom of speech as it affects advertising may be more important than it seems—because it is at the heart of an economic system which has served most of its citizens pretty well. To impair the freedom of speech in advertising might have far-reaching consequences indeed.

In a nation of two hundred million people, the right to advertise is, I believe, essential to a business system based on competition. If it is to the best interests of the United States, and I believe it is, to have many centers of power, advertising is essential. In a state-controlled economy or in a monopoly situation, it is of far less significance.

There are a number of threads that weave their way through the arguments of the well-intentioned people who wish to restrict freedom of speech in advertising, and I will discuss each one in turn. The first is the Myth of the Defenseless Consumer. The second is the notion that the role of advertising should be restricted to the delivery of objective product information. The third is the profound belief that advertising is all-powerful and that once business makes up its mind to sell a product or an idea and unleashes the force of advertising, it never fails. The fourth is that self-policing by the advertising business is worthless. The fifth is the notion that a supergovernment bureau overseeing advertising would protect and aid the consumer.

Let's examine the Myth of the Defenseless Consumer. Here are a couple of facts. In 1972 the median family-income in the United States was $11,116. In the midst of rampant inflation, the average family has to pay taxes, provide shelter, buy food, buy drugs, send children to school and college, provide medical care, buy insurance, provide transportation, clothe and amuse themselves from this sum of money. This is no mean feat, and I submit that it is only the most sublime snobbery that could lead one to the conclusion that families that manage to live within this median income are a bunch of simpleminded suckers who cannot make rational choices without the help of consumer groups and the government.

The fact is, as any marketer knows all too well, that the American family, and particularly the American housewife, is a very canny buyer indeed. If she bought for her family the way that the United States government buys for the Defense Department, her budget would be in the same shape that the national budget is—and that condition is not allowed by our lending institutions. She checks the food pages on Thursday with the greatest care. She knows to the penny what Safeway, the A&P, and Piggly-Wiggly are charging for Maxwell House Coffee this week. She has made cut-rate drugstores a national institution. It is no accident that J.C. Penney and Sears are the monoliths of the retail business and growing by leaps and bounds.

And her husband is no dummy either. Who built the Volkswagen business in this country? Who forced Detroit to make over half of its cars nice, small, economical ones? Who waited until color television brought its price below $500 before buying? Who has built Holiday Inns into a national institution because they provided clean, pleasant, cheap accommodations where none had existed before?

In the experience of advertising and marketing people, the consumer is a very sharp, very opinionated, very tough customer. The consumer groups don't care to believe it, but it is far more often true that the consumer leads the manufacturer to the development of a new product or service than the manufacturer forces a product or a service down an unwilling public's throat by dint of advertising or any other marketing technique. In the development of new products, one of the absolutely vital starting points is the focused group-interview. Consumers are brought into a discussion of a product category, and they air their views. Their views are listened to with profound care because they often lead the manufacturer to an idea he would not have had on his own—and always they guide the manufacturer as to what the parameters of acceptability are. Woe to the businessman so arrogant that he does not listen to his customers.

Strangely enough, most of the consumer groups seem most active in defending the middle-class and upper-class consumers, who need their help least. The poor find few champions and it is in the economic ghettoes of our country, urban and rural, that the Defenseless Consumer can be found. Who gets gouged on rent? Who pays higher prices for food? Who pays exorbitant interests rates? Who gets clipped, gulled, gypped, double-crossed, bilked, swindled, victimized, hoodwinked, and generally screwed to the wall? I do not believe it is the average consumer whom the consumer groups are mobilizing. But experience tells me it certainly is the black, the Puerto Rican, the Mexican-American, and the white who has made the all-American error of being poor. I cannot find my senses raging at the fact that there is sugar coating on the cereal of a little boy in Lake Forest. But I will certainly join any crusade to stop the outrageous economic brutalizing of the nation's poor.

The second myth is the notion that the role of advertising should be restricted to the delivery of objective product information. In fact, all advertising is advocacy, an attempt to persuade the consumer that the product or service or idea being set forth is a good one, if not a superior one. The consumer understands that advertising is advocacy. He or she would consider it to be pretty foolish behavior for a manufacturer not to put his best foot forward in an advertisement or commercial. It is ex-

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Brudnoy's Film Index

■ **Ash Wednesday**: A hymn of praise to the art of plastic surgery, face- and breast-lift variety. Elizabeth Taylor is old, old old old and her husband, Henry Fonda, is hot for young stuff, so Liz goes to a Swiss beauty farm and has the complete job. But along comes Helmut Berger, a Younger Man, and by the time hubby arrives and lets on that new face or old, Liz is out, and the audience has concluded that there must be an easier way.

■ **Cinderella Liberty**: James Caan as a sailor with heart of gold, ready to undertake the regeneration trip with a chippie an officer refers to as a champagne-cocktail-sipping-teasing, dance-hall tart, or somesuch. Her only baggage is a twelve-year-old mulatto son, illegitimate, and a kid, ditto, on the way, but sailors' dreams never die, ergo. . . .

■ **Day for Night**: Truffaut's song to the cinema, an intricate, yet easy ramble through the ironies of movie-making within the well-made flick. A French connection worth making.

■ **Executive Action**: As everyone knows, the rightwing killed JFK. What? You didn't know? Let Dalton Trumbo, Donald Freed, and Mark Lane show you, courtesy of Burt Lancaster, Will Geer, Robert Ryan (as the heavies), old news footage, constructed news footage, and Lee Harvey Who? as the patsy. Next up: how the Klan framed Sirhan so that the Minutemen could kill Bobby Kennedy; after which, Hollywood's version of the great Birch conspiracy to murder Martin Luther King. One for the zanies only.

■ **The Exorcist**: William Peter Blatty's compelling novel screened magnificently. Ellen Burstyn as the mother, Max von Sydow and Jason Miller as the exorcising priests, Linda Blair as daughter Regan and the devil himself. This one is so superior to most scare-em-uppers that the genre must henceforth revise its canons and take off from this. A must-see, but read the book first for a double treat.

■ **Jonathan Livingston Seagull**: Watch out for the droppings; this one is full of it. Never underestimate the power of dreck in Hollywood hands.

■ **Last Tango in Paris**: Threatens to endure as long as Nixon.

■ **The New Land**: Conclusion to Jan Troel's two-part epic, following 1972's *The Emigrants*. Incomparably the finest treatment of the great European folk migration to the U.S. in the nineteenth century. Another stunning performance by von Sydow, liberated from Ingmar Bergman at last.

■ **The Paper Chase**: So *that's* what it's like at Harvard Law! The prof gets all the best lines; Harvard will survive this trifle.

■ **Papillon**: Oh, 13 million bucks, give or take a million, to chart French safe-cracker Henri Charrière's many escapes from imprisonment in French Guyana. Humorless, endless, but with moments of Dustin Hoffman as Louis, who saves the film hither and yon from Steve McQueen as Papillon (Charrière). A puff for prison reform, at the very least, and guess which man named D*LT*N TR*MB* is involved again. . . .

■ **Sleeper**: Woody Allen's back, superlatively wacky, in a tale of 200 years hence. The one-liners are side-splitting, quite so, and the sight-gags are Keatonesque. Diane Keaton is on hand to help Woody escape from the cops, circa 2173; they haven't changed a bit. Neither has Woody, thanks be.

■ **The Sting**: Newman and Redford together again as lovable con men outwitting the baddies, looking smashing in 1930s duds; and if the film is less than first-rate, at least the costumes, cars, and props recall an era well.

■ **Walking Tall**: Reissued and going strong, this tale of a Southern sheriff cleaning out the evil ones feeds on the American bloodlust; popular with rednecks North and South; a violent picture that works, more's the pity.

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pected and the consumer allows for this natural bias.

It happens that the presentation of a lot of factual information is a very powerful selling vehicle indeed. I grew up at Ogilvy, Benson, and Mather where David Ogilvy presented more facts more artfully than anyone before or since. The Rolls-Royce advertisements of his time, and to this very day, provide the consumer with a veritable torrent of facts about that noble car. Our agency does the corporate advertising for Exxon, and we have found—because the public told us so—that the very best way to gain understanding for the oil business and its various complex problems is to tell all—every fact that is germane about offshore drilling, supertankers, the energy crisis, and so forth. We ran eight full pages in an insert on offshore drilling and every page was read better than any other advertisement in the magazine. The more you tell, the more you sell, Ogilvy preached to me. And often that's right.

But there are product categories and advertising problems that are not best solved by reams of product information. Perfume. Fashion. Cosmetics. Hot dogs. Let me try to explain what I mean. Much perfume is made, as you know, with a base of ambergris which is the morbid excretion in the alimentary canal of the sperm whale. I submit that this piece of product information has little to do with what a woman wants to know about perfume and might even prove counterproductive to her understanding of Chanel No. 5. Sometimes when I look into the flinty eyes of the reformers, I wonder if they would not be more comfortable in a world without perfume. They must be victims of olfactory fatigue never to have stood in a room when a woman walked in wafting the perfumes of Araby and rendering normal males happily senseless, even if the perfume did rest on a base of the morbid excretion in the alimentary canal of the sperm whale.

Our joyless friends can do without perfume, but can they do without the hot dog? And yet what does it profit a man to know how many pig snouts are resting in the bosom of his beloved frank? You might just kill one of America's genuine cultural contributions with enough product information about the homely hot dog.

If you take a walk in Warsaw—or at Bob Jones University in South Carolina for that matter—you can get a look at men and women who live in a world without fashion and without cosmetics. It seems a drab and dreary world indeed by comparison to the outside universe. And yet there is no relationship between objective product facts and the cut of a Dior dress or the color of a Revlon lipstick. Let's be careful before we restrict the freedom of advertising speech to a recitation of objective product facts. Too much of the joy of the world would fly out of the window that dreary day.

The third myth that afflicts our reformers is that advertising is all-powerful. When Vance Packard said that there was something called subliminal advertising, the reformers believed every unsubstantiated word of it. If it were true, why isn't there one recorded example of a marketer using it? The consumerists, in their earnest way, are far more true believers in advertising than its practitioners. Because they have been mercifully removed from the realities of the marketplace, and we cannot escape knowledge so easily. After all, at this moment, you are listening to the man who wrote the advertising for Rinso Soap, which, backed by five million dollars, did absolutely nothing to convince American women that soap was better than detergents. DuPont developed Corfam as a replacement for shoe leather and spent tens of millions of dollars in an utterly unsuccessful attempt to persuade people that Corfam was good for them. The soup companies have been particularly active in trying to get women to buy dried soups. First, Knorr spent million after million on this worthy project. Then Campbell, which makes few mistakes, did the same with Red Kettle Soupmixes with spectacular lack of success. Not to mention Edsel, or the entire effort to keep American families in great big cars when they didn't want to be.

New product introduction is a channel sown with more shoals than Ulysses ever imagined. Time after time, the manufacturer goes to market with what seems a swell idea and invariably backed by large sums for advertising. The mortality rate for new products is more than 50 percent, as reported by A.C. Nielsen. And usually for the same reason. The dogs don't like it. As the old saw goes, you can lead a horticulture but you can't make her think. This is true, true and true again in the world of marketing. The dogs have to like it or no amount of advertising will make them do so.

Now sometimes the dogs like something that the consumer advocates and other social critics don't want them to like. The dogs like Big Macs. And they love Holiday Inns, no matter how ugly they may be. They like to drink. And the power of advertising has never been so dented as by

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the whole smoking controversy. Here are some fascinating facts. In 1969, before cigarettes were attacked via antismoking ads or forbidden to advertise on television, per capita consumption of cigarettes was 3,993 per year. In 1970, what has been called the year of the most sweeping attack ever mounted against a large scale commercial entity, per capita consumption was 3,985—a drop of eight cigarettes per capita per year. In 1971, consumption grew to 4,039 per capita per year without the benefit of television advertising and in 1972 held at that level with 4,040.

It is clear what did not happen. The removal of cigarette advertising from television did not affect smoking volume. The airing of tens of millions of dollars worth of antismoking commercials had no effect that can be measured. But what did happen is almost more interesting. Competition and innovation were dealt a crippling blow. Not one of the many new cigarettes that have been introduced since the television ban has achieved as much as one-half of one percent of the market.

Advertising is effective when it is put behind a product, service, or idea that people want. It is worthless if the dogs don't like the product, service, or idea. All-powerful it ain't.

The fourth myth is that self-policing by the advertising business is worthless. I have to confess that I had many reservations about the effectiveness of self-policing myself when it was first proposed. But it seems to me that the National Advertising Review Board has been set up with great care and has performed its job with diligence and rectitude. Men like Charles Yost and Edwin Etherington have been precisely the sort of people who have given credence to the job of self-regulation.

One of the disappointments to the consumer advocates is how few complaints there have been about national advertising. As of July 31, 1973, a total of 563 complaints had been received by the National Advertising Division of the Better Business Bureaus. Of these, 175 were dismissed, 110 were upheld, and 186 were administratively closed. And there is an interesting trend among the complaints that the Division does receive. An ever-increasing percentage of them do not come from consumers or from consumer advocate groups. They are coming from *competitors* whose own ox is being gored, either in fact or in the opinion of the complainant.

One could conjecture that there are not many abuses of the truth made in national advertising. It's terribly public, you know. And most of the companies who are national advertisers have a huge stake in the future reputation of their company names. No near-term profit is worth the long-term tarnishing of their reputations.

The fifth myth is that a supergovernment bureau for consumer protection would be of aid and benefit to the consumer. Any student of government regulatory bodies has a right to some skepticism in this matter. The Securities and Exchange Commission is the classic example of the regulatory body that has worked for the benefit of the public and of the business it oversees. But what of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the railroads? The ICC has set rail rates and protected the public from the abuses of railroads since 1887. There have been other factors, to be sure, but the consumer now has virtually no rail service to be served by and what it has isn't all that cheap. It is hard to believe that a railroad industry left to set its own rates and make its own competitive decisions could have done worse by the American public.

The Civil Aeronautics Board may prove in time to do as much harm to the consumer's best interests in the air transportation world. If an airline wishes to provide transportation at a lower price to the consumer, it may not do it. And there are plenty who want to. It is also hard to believe that a competing airline industry would have made some of the buying decisions that have murdered their profitability in the past few years. It is a subsidized industry and all too dependent on the federal government to think much of the consumer and his or her best interests.

Of course, there are plenty of government watchdog organizations as it is. Mary Bennett Patterson points out that truth-in-lending alone is supervised by the FTC, the FRB, the ICC, the CAB, the Agriculture Department, the FDIC, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, the Bureau of Federal Credit Union, and the Comptroller of the Currency.

Speaking of the FTC, its efforts have been noble in intent but sometimes highly ignoble in procedure. As Tom Dillon of BBDO pointed out at exhaustive length, the almost unbelievable unfairness of the way it goes about its business is all too provable. The naming of companies and products in press releases when not one iota of evidence has been passed upon by the FTC is scandalous, and if you think that's all, read Mr. Dillon's carefully documented speech.

The FTC has done splendid work here and there. I think they forced the advertising business into light-years of progress in television commercials in their decision that everything shown on a television screen or on a magazine page should be what it is purported to be. Lazy television producers constantly told us in the bad old days that you couldn't photograph coffee or this or that. Overnight, ways were found after the FTC decision.

But what on earth should make us think that a superconsumer protection agency would act with fairness and justice? We have had enough evidence in the last year that concentration of power is a very real temptation to evil in Washington. Let's be careful before we legislate restrictions on freedom of speech for advertisers. It is still true that "corporations make the finest political enemies in the world" as none other than Huey Long said many years ago. But let's be very careful about protecting every one's freedom of speech, including that of the corporations.

As Senator Sam Ervin, a solon I would rather follow than the Kingfish, said:

"Government cannot be trusted to honor the commandments of the First Amendment. In general, the courts have adopted and applied a First Amendment theory distinguishing between 'commercial' speech and other speech on the basis of an asserted difference in the social purpose and value of these types of speech.

"A man can peddle his faith and his politics with only minimal Government restrictions, but he cannot peddle his goods and services, however much enrichment they may bring to his fellow citizens, without considerable Government regulation.

"I do not propose a sweeping rejection of all the regulations governing and restrictions on advertising which various levels of Government have imposed. But I do suggest that the expression of ideas in advertising is a vital part of the total system of free expression of thought which the First Amendment was designed to protect. If Government at any level ever assumes the authority to prohibit absolutely the advertisement of perfectly legal products, if it ever assumes the role of final arbiter as to what is truth-in-advertising, if it develops the power to dictate to the people what they should buy and for what reason, then not only will the dissemination and exchange of economic ideas be dead, but freedom in all its many facets will soon disappear from our land." □

"Next Issue"

Coming In April:

Reviews of
Buckley, Gilder, Kenner, and White

And Featuring
Harvey Mansfield, Jr.
"Defending Liberalism"

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"Whom the gods destroy they first make mad"– Euripedes

Current Wisdom

THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE

The intelligent response to a local editorial by a high-grade product of the remarkable Indiana school system:

To the editor:

I would like to express my feelings and thoughts to your editorial published Saturday, Dec. 8, 1973 under "Our Opinion."

Your publication indeed expresses your opinion, what you lack in ignorance you make up for in stupidity.

Talking as a truck owner and operator and for many others as myself who live with this way of life. I'll try and fill you in on this Golden Opportunity as T.V. advertises it.

If it wasn't for these shameful bully boy truck drivers you wouldn't have any interstates to ride on. No, we don't classify ourselves as a special class of Americans either.

The average independent owner operator purchases his tractor and trailer at the cost of what the Average American pays for two homes. This figure is well in the $40,000.00 bracket, and on top of this he pays a high interest rate, pays this astronomical amount in the period of three to four years.

Each and every state he travels through the operator must secure permits and file quarterly reports so that each and every state can get its share of the operators money. Then of course, we have our so called Interstates that collect tolls and this is another ten to twelve cents a mile.

We won't mention the Federal Highway Use Tax each trucker pays, each and every year.

Now we come to the fuel prices. You drive your car to the service station and put in 12 or 15 gallons of gas, and boy how you holler when they raise the price a couple of pennies. Well, friend go to a truck stop and put in about 150 to 200 gallons of diesel fuel and the price has doubled. Better still, you stop here and get 10 to 20 gallons and drive and get another 10 to 20 and you spend more time looking for diesel fuel than you do driving.

Let's get down to the pay scale. Yes, we make real good money and when the end of the year comes and you start figuring your time your damn lucky if you make a $1.00 an hour.

As for the Teamsters Union, their record for the past several years speaks for itself.

The independent owner operator PAYS MORE TAXES IN ONE YEAR THAN OUR MOST HONORABLE PRESIDENT NIXON HAS PAID IN THE PAST FOUR YEARS.

A closing thought from a World War II veteran.

President Nixon has done to this country in six months what Germany and Japan combined could not do in four years.

P.S. you spell Nixon like you spell Exon.

—Bloomington Herald Telephone

CRANK CALLS

Intrepid reporter, Jack Anderson, shows how he mixes business with pleasure, operating out of a clandestine public phone booth in our nation's Capitol:

Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger has such a dry, offbeat sense of humor that his associates cannot tell when he's kidding and when he's telling the truth.

One day last spring, when Schlesinger was director of the Central Intelligence Agency, he came to work with his hand in a cast. His aides asked him what had happened.

"I broke my hand while spanking one of my kids," replied the father of eight without a trace of a smile.

When we asked Schlesinger's office whether he had really broken his hand on a youngster's backside, he refused to comment.

—Washington Post

THE LIGHTER SIDE

One of those memorable flashes of jocosity that is forever livening up the *Nation*, a journal of political neurosis:

The President, responsible for Agnew's rise and fall, was all shook up by Agnew's resignation. The Vice President's departure has left him with a sense of "deep personal loss." So farewell to you, Spiro; you will be remembered as the flashiest dresser to serve as Vice President since Lyndon Johnson.

—Nation

GIBBERISH

The postwar "swing" of American politics as seen by a clear-headed donkey, braying at the *Nation*:

Of the remarkable group that made up Roosevelt's Cabinet and advisers, Wallace has come through most damaged in reputation. All the major New Deal personalities—Hopkins, Ickes, Morgenthau, et al.—have lost some of their earlier sheen because of the long swing to the Right in American politics.

—Nation

THE END OF AN ERA

Another assault on the First Amendment in the Nixon era:

The president of the Detroit Common Council has introduced a resolution calling for an end to Polish jokes "and other forms of ethnic, racial and religious humor."

Mel Ravitz said his resolution was prompted by the recent publication of "The Official Polish Joke Book," and a resulting protest by the Polish American Folk Theater.

—Associated Press

MOMENT OF TRUTH

In a world, bright with humanitarian regimes like those of Russia and China, the *New York Times* still does not fail to report the bad news:

Representatives of three international organizations committed to the defense of human rights declared today that in Chile those rights "are now being systematically violated through practice and legal text."

"We send 30 to 40 missions around the world yearly and we have not seen in recent years a situation so grave as that in Chile (not even Brazil or Greece)," Joe Nordmann, a French jurist, declared.

—New York Times
October 13, 1973

INTERVIEWING GENIUSES

Dr. John D. Lofton, Jr., noted philosopher and humanist interviews one, Robert McCartney, an enlightened and saucy college boy who is taking the lead in the drive to evaporate the hated Nixon and who is eager to distribute the fruits of his intellect:

Expressing a "limited faith" in the courts to rule on the legality of the Cambodia bombing, McCartney says this is not as important as the fact that anyone doing such a thing should be "thrown out of office." On what grounds? "On the grounds that killing people just because you're President, without telling anyone, is a travesty of the democratic process."

On the "Ellsberg burglary," McCartney says he suspects the President was aware of it and possibly ordered it but "can't point to any specific document or testimony."

. . . interviewing still another of the gifted young students who have taken time from their busy schedules to rid the Republic of Nixon, Dr. Lofton turns up a nascent George McGovern, Mr. Robert Steinbrook, a sophomore from Amherst:

How were the President's actions in the I.T.T. case illegal, deceitful and hypocritical as charged in [his] editorial? Well, number one, said Steinbrook, the President asked Attorney General Kleindienst not to appeal the case.

And what's illegal about that? "Nothing," he replied. But there's the perjury before the Senate Judiciary Committee about the case, he tried again. When I point out that the person allegedly perjuring himself was Kleindienst, not the President, and ask if the editorial wasn't calling for the impeachment of Nixon, not Kleindienst, Steinbrook replies: "That's right. You've made a very good point. I can't answer you at this time."

As to the "milk deals," Steinbrook again refuses to go point by point through his editorial because "you're destroying me." He suggests we talk again later.

—Bloomington Courier Tribune

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Correspondence

To the Editor:

Little will be gained by a rehash of Grover Rees' writings as John Randolph, nor is there much point in haggling with him over his inventive analogy: the urge to murder and homosexual tendencies. The reader can compare Rees-Randolph's "Say it ain't so, Dave," with Mr. Rees' letter in this section in the January issue. A few points, however, are worthy of note.

Mr. Rees believes that I "apparently tried to squelch publication" of his piece. This is not in fact the case. I objected to his use of a pseudonym to mask his identity, in that he was mouthing the usual hateful line, once popular all across the political spectrum but especially fashionable in the sort of right-wing circles Mr. Rees and his then-employer frequent, and he hardly had anything to lose by identifying himself with that sort of ignorance. But once it was explained to me that Mr. Rees insisted on shielding his employer by using "Randolph" as his piece's author, I let it go at that. *At no time did I attempt to censor his article.* I trust the editor will verify me on this; I assume it was an inadvertence that caused Mr. Rees' letter, containing the serious error, to be published in January without a corrective from the editor.

One more point: Evidently nothing, not an appeal to his sense of decency or to his faculty of reason, will get Mr. Rees to comprehend the grossness of his language. I must say, Rees' "Queers. Queers queers queers" looks odd in *The Alternative*, a journal which would not print a correspondent's letter containing a sentence and a half on the order of: "Niggers. Niggers niggers niggers." Or "Kikes. Kikes kikes kikes." Or "Spics. Spics spics spics." Nor do I believe Mr. Rees would be found publicly writing other such noisome epithets. Ah, but homosexuals are still fair game for asinine humor, and the righteous Mr. Rees licks his chops and snarls away. Perhaps Mr. Rees would do well, since my words fall on deaf ears, to attend to Edith Efron's letter in the December "Correspondence" section. Rees-Randolph is nicely characterized there by Miss Efron as a "bully boy," and her call for a humane attitude on this matter stands in marked contrast to Mr. Rees' petulant insistence on writing like, and thinking like, a troglodyte.

I write this letter not in hopes of ever altering Mr. Rees' sealed mind, but only in order that the record be set straight: a) Mr. Rees' daring use of the epithet "queer" marks him, no doubt, as a tremendous heman, and we shall all swoon next time he passes by; b) I await his use of such terms as "wops, greasers, polacks, micks, chinks, japs, and gooks" to see how extensive his vocabulary of cruelty is; and c) I did not censor his piece, try to censor his piece, or wish in my heart to censor his piece.

David Brudnoy
Boston, Massachusetts

Mr. Brudnoy is quite right. At no time did he try to squelch publication of Mr. Rees' piece. Frankly this whole correspondence has me so baffled I am retiring from my editorial chamber to spend more time with my butterfly collection. *Editor*

To the Editor:

As a longtime member of the Loyal Order of the Moose I find your editorial in the January 1974 *Alternative* has committed an unforgivable injustice to our benevolent organization.

How can any self-respecting Moose hold their head high in his community when you refer to our lodge's activities as "nincompoop pageantry" and "trashy get-togethers."

All of your readers who have had the opportunity to frequent our fine Moose club-bars know what genuine service we perform in any community. Your magazine has the misconception that clubs like the Moose have become a haven for a community's social misfits, derelicts, DPs, etc. Yet our organization is open to all ranks in society, from bluecollar to lawyer. All can find companionship, good conversation, and even be elected to some highranking position in the organization. Let there be no doubt that these are sought after honors as witnessed by many mayors, congressmen, and Senators who have attained such recognition.

H. Vrdolyk
New York City

To the Editor:

Your publication generally holds a high level, with only occasional lapses into journalistic insobriety. . . .

But the limit has been exceeded by Benjamin Stein's review of *The Long Good-bye.* In describing this cinematic rubbish, Mr. Stein decides to comment on the author of the novel from which the film draws its name: "The Raymond Chandler kind of detective story hovered for so long and so precariously on the brink of being absurd . . . that the slight push over the edge which (the director) has given it does not work against it at all."

Such ignorance is bizarre. First, there is no such thing as the "Raymond Chandler kind of detective story." Many tried to imitate him, none succeeded. The evidence is abundant. Chandler was the only mystery writer of his time to receive serious literary attention, both here and in his native Britain. His works sold prodigiously on both sides of the Atlantic, and are prominently featured in libraries thirty years after publication. Chandler was an innovative writer who combined sparkling and (intentionally) humorous dialogue, with a brilliant sense of pacing. As he matured he also developed a powerful talent for characterization, best exemplified in *The Long Good-bye.* Chandler's colleagues, the mystery writer's professional society, voted *The Long Good-bye* the best mystery novel of 1953.

More important, Chandler's works were profoundly traditional in outlook. Writing of America in the 30s and 40s, Chandler found social plagues that have exploded into the national conscience in the last few years: narcotics addiction, pornography, moral decadence, and unreasoning violence. Chandler found these things among the jaded wealthy, second and third generation rich people bored with life, looking for the better high. The development of this decadent trend is all around us today, in Westchester, Shaker Heights, Hyannis Port and other centers of upper-middle class limousine liberalism. . . .

Phillip Marlowe's reaction to this rotting upper crust of society was a simple revulsion. He fought its effects, and put his life on the line to help break a corrupt police department in a city controlled by gangsters (*Bay City Blues*). The latter story was based on the actual example of Santa Monica, California, well before the crooked political ring was broken there.

The Phillip Marlowe character was a near-tragic one. He was a man of uncompromising integrity challenged by the erosion of culture and decency all around him.

I urge *Alternative* readers (which includes Mr. Stein if he knows how to read) to familiarize themselves with Chandler's novels firsthand: *The Big Sleep, Farewell My Lovely, The Lady in the Lake,* or *The Long Good-bye.* Do not depend on Hollywood, which Chandler left in the 40s after they butchered three of his novels.

Elliot Gould, arrgggh!

James Sills
San Diego, California

To the Editor:

Reading William Gavin's critique of Felix Morley's article, I was amazed that it in no way invalidated for me the points which he criticized. Mr. Morley may disagree with me in part or even in full, but allow me a few comments.

First of all, American tradition is definitely "revolutionary" but what do I mean by that? Read Edmund Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution in France.* The purpose of that book was to prove that the events of 1789–1792 in France were *not* revolutionary. As he points out, the first two uses of that word were to refer to the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the American Revolution, by which I mean the period 1760–1789 and not just the war for independence. The outstanding idea of these two events was to defend/restore what two geographically and chronologically separate groups of Englishmen saw as their "rights." Revolution is not change, it is the reaffirming of traditional institutions in the face of desirable and orderly change. Since then the word "revolution" has been misused by such well-meaning liberals as Thomas Jefferson, who saw 1789 as revolutionary because of the affinities of its rhetoric with his own ideals. But those ideals were alien to France. How can one reaffirm or restore what has not previously existed? When the Reign of Terror repudiated those ideals, the

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dominant idea of 1789 became radical change and that is how the word "revolution" has been used ever since. But that definition is contradictory. The root of "revolution" is "revolve" and I defy anyone to show me a dictionary that lists "revolve" and "change" as synonyms.

If American tradition is revolutionary, is conservatism consistent with it? First of all, what is "conservatism?" On this point there is some merit in praising the superiority of the European. What is two distinct groups in Europe is lumped together in the U.S. The European conservative is called a traditionalist here. He is a man who is loyal to institutions even while critical of the men composing them. In 1776 he was the American Tory. The European liberal is the American libertarian. He is a man who is loyal to concepts such as no taxation without one's consent, the dignity of the individual, etc. He was the American Revolutionary and his institutions, because of their unheralded success in history, have been accepted by the traditionalists. So defined, conservatism is applicable to our "revolutionary" heritage.

Why all the confusion then? Precisely because of the different definitions of revolution, conservatism, and liberalism, and we American conservatives, or whatever we are, are to be blamed. Unlike the Europeans, the Americans never recognized socialism, in both its communist and Fascist-Nazi varieties, as being distinct from conservatism and liberalism. As Professor Anthony Bouscaren stated in a lecture at this past summer's Georgetown Institute, communism and Fascism belong not to the left and right of liberalism and conservatism, but in the balcony above. We Americans in our naïveté have allowed the socialists to define themselves as "liberals" and "revolution" as radical change. In spite of the identicalness of our ends and the minimal differences in our means, American traditionalists and libertarians have obligingly allowed ourselves to be forced into a dictated alliance, thus assuring our infighting and ineffectiveness, for our only possible reaction to force is just that, reaction. It is not surprising to me, therefore, that we conservatives appear confused and inept in spite of our potential. . . .

Michael E. Pollock
Williamsburg, Virginia

To the Editor:

Just a note to thank and congratulate you for publishing "The Business of America" series by Lindley Clark. Clark's articles defending the American system of free enterprise are a needed antidote in this age of antibusiness sentiment. It's good to see that highbrow intellectual journals such as *The Alternative* are also interested in basic questions of economics and business, and I urge you to make the business column a regular feature.

Alfred David
Chicago, Illinois

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